There’s no clear need for Peter Dutton’s new bill excluding citizens from Australia


Sangeetha Pillai, UNSW

Yesterday, the government introduced a bill into Parliament that, if passed, would allow the home affairs minister Peter Dutton to temporarily exclude some Australian citizens – including children – from returning to Australia.

The bill is aimed at mitigating threats posed by foreign fighters coming back to Australia from conflicts in Syria and Iraq. It was first put before Parliament in February, and has now been reintroduced with some amendments.




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The bill draws on similar legislation in the UK and, if passed, would add to an arsenal of around 75 pieces of anti-terrorism legislation currently operating in Australia.

National security laws must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. But the government has not made it clear how the bill would fill an identified gap in Australia’s already extensive national security regime.

How would the bill work?

If passed, the bill will allow the minister to issue a Temporary Exclusion Order (TEO) preventing an Australian citizen who is overseas from re-entering Australia. These exclusion orders aren’t designed to exclude citizens from Australia forever, but rather to provide a system that manages their return.

A TEO can be imposed on a citizen outside Australia if they are at least 14 years old, and:

  • the minister reasonably suspects that issuing the TEO would substantially help prevent terrorism-related acts, or

  • ASIO has assessed the person to be a direct or indirect risk to security, for reasons related to political violence. ASIO doesn’t need to be satisfied to any standard of proof when making this assessment.

But neither of these criteria actually requires a TEO candidate to have engaged in any wrongdoing.

A person may not enter Australia while a TEO is in force against them. If they do, they can face up to two years behind bars. A TEO may also require the person to surrender their Australian passport.

Each TEO can be issued for a maximum of two years, but a person may have multiple TEOs issued against them. This means the actual period of exclusion from Australia can be much longer.

So how does a return to Australia work?

The return of citizens with TEOs against them is managed through “return permits”. This is designed to allow the government to monitor and control foreign fighters’ entry and presence in Australia. A return permit must be issued if the person applies for one, or if a foreign country moves to deport them to Australia.




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A return permit may prescribe various conditions. Significantly, it doesn’t guarantee an immediate right to return to Australia – a person may be prohibited from entering Australia for up to 12 months after the permit is issued.

Once in Australia, a range of post-entry conditions may also be imposed. These can include passport surrender, and requirements to report changes to residence or employment, contact with particular individuals and technology use.

Breaching the conditions of a return permit is an offence, punishable by up to two years in prison.

Are the proposed laws constitutional and compatible with international law?

The right to return to one’s country is commonly regarded as a core aspect of citizenship. And some experts have argued that a citizen’s right to return home is constitutionally protected in Australia.

But the High Court has never ruled on the question of whether a constitutional right of this nature exists, so it’s impossible to say for certain whether the bill, if passed, would be unconstitutional. Still, it’s likely to face constitutional challenge.

In any case, international law protects an individual’s right to voluntarily return to their country of citizenship. The government acknowledges that TEOs restrict a person’s capacity to do this, but says the bill is justified because it’s “reasonable, necessary and proportionate”. This, however, isn’t clear.

Does the bill contain adequate safeguards?

In April, when reviewing the original bill, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security recommended 18 changes, aimed at improving safeguards.

But the new bill only took on seven changes in full, including requiring the minister to consider specific criteria when imposing a TEO on a child, and providing independent oversight of decisions to issue TEOs.




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Importantly, some of the committee’s most significant recommendations have been ignored, such as narrowing the criteria for issuing a TEO. And others have only been partially implemented.

Given the significant impact a TEO has on a person, the bill should adopt the committee’s recommendations in full.

Is the bill even necessary?

In parliament, Dutton said national security agencies advise that many Australians who have travelled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to support extremist groups are “likely to seek return to Australia in the very near future”, and the bill is needed to keep Australians safe.

But the government hasn’t explained why Australia’s extensive suite of existing anti-terrorism mechanisms doesn’t already adequately protect against threats posed by Australians returning from conflict zones.

Australia’s 75 pieces of legislation provide for criminal penalties, civil alternatives to prosecution, expanded police and intelligence powers, and citizenship revocation.

And they protect Australia from the risks posed by returning foreign fighters in a variety of ways.

For example, a person who returns to Australia as a known member of a terrorist organisation can be charged with an offence punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Where the person has done more – such as fight, resource or train with the organisation – penalties of up to 25 years each apply.

Although gathering sufficient evidence to prosecute returning foreign fighters can prove challenging, there are mechanisms in our legislation that already account for this.

For instance, a control order may be imposed on a person in cases where they are deemed a risk but there is not enough evidence to prosecute. This restricts the person’s actions through measures such as curfews and monitoring requirements.




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Evidence shows the existing measures work effectively. Police and intelligence agencies have successfully disrupted a significant number of terror plots using existing laws, most recently just days ago.

Arguably, this suggests Australia has not only the capacity, but also the responsibility to use the full force of our laws to bring foreign fighters to justice in Australia, rather than leave them stranded in conflict zones where their only connections may be to terrorist groups, thereby weakening global security.

Of course, if it’s to remain fit for purpose, Australia’s national security framework must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. But with extensive, demonstrably effective mechanisms in place, the government must clearly explain what gap this bill would fill. This has not been done.The Conversation

Sangeetha Pillai, Senior Research Associate, Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Law School, UNSW

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Australia is vulnerable to a catastrophic cyber attack, but the Coalition has a poor cyber security track record


Greg Austin, UNSW

This article is part of a series examining the Coalition government’s record on key issues while in power and what Labor is promising if it wins the 2019 federal election.


The government’s chief cyber security coordinator, Alastair McGibbon, told an audience of specialists in November 2018 that the prospect of a catastrophic cyber incident is:

the greatest existential threat we face as a society today.

Using a nautical metaphor, he said such an event was not far off on the horizon, but could be on the next wave. He cited what one technology expert called the most devastating cyber attack in history, the NotPetya attack in 2017. NotPetya was a random attack on a single day that cost one Danish global company more than A$400 million dollars.

The latest dire warning from the government is appropriate, yet its policy responses have not quite matched the challenge – or their own commitments.




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Cyber security is everyone’s business

The government is 16 months into a departmental reorganisation in order to deliver better cyber security responses, especially through the new Home Affairs Department. That department has been very busy with everyday skirmishes in the escalating confrontations of cyberspace – from Huawei and 5G policy, to foreign cyber attacks on Australian members of parliament.

But Home Affairs is not the only department with a broad responsibility in cyber security policy. On the military side, the Defence Organisation has moved decisively and with discipline. In 2017, it announced the creation of a 1,000-strong joint cyber unit to be in place within a decade. It also announced increased funding to expand the number of people working in civilian defence roles on cyber operations.

Another department with potentially heavy responsibilities is the Department of Education, working with universities, the TAFE sector and schools. Unfortunately, it appears to be missing in action when it comes to cyber security.

Key plans have stalled

In April 2016, Prime Minister Turnbull released a National Cyber Security Strategy. It included commitments to grow the cyber workforce (especially for women), expand the cyber security industry and undertake annual reviews of the strategy itself.

But in key places the ambitious plans appear to have stalled or fallen short. As a result of the Turnbull overthrow, the post of Minister for Cyber Security – which was only created two years previously – disappeared. The 2018 annual review of the strategy was not released, if it took place at all. The annual threat report of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACSC) did not appear in 2018 either.

In November 2018, AustCyber, an industry growth centre that is one good outcome of the 2016 strategy, published its second Sector Competitiveness Plan. Typical of government funded agencies, it reports much good news. Australia is indeed an international powerhouse of cyber security capability. What is unclear from the report is whether the government’s 2016 strategy has much to do with that.




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Where we’re falling short

One indicator that we’re off-track is the fact the AustCyber report of 2018 has no data on the participation of women in the sector after 2016. Reports from the decade prior to 2016 showed a decline from 22% down to 19%, but the government does not appear to be tracking this important commitment after it was made.

In other bad news, the AustCyber report concludes that the education and workforce goals remain unfulfilled. It is hard to estimate how badly, since the initial strategy of April 2016 set no baselines or metrics. AustCyber now assesses that:

the skills shortage in Australia’s cyber security sector is more severe than initially estimated and is already producing real economic costs.

On the government’s commitment to increase the cyber workforce, AustCyber reports growth over the previous two years of 7% – roughly 3.5% per year. But it probably needs to be of the order of 10% per year for a full ten years if the gap identified by the report is to be met:

The latest assessment indicates Australia may need up to 17,600 additional cyber security workers by 2026 …

The government has provided $1.9 million over four years to promote university cyber security education in two Australian universities. That amount is so small it might not even be called a drop in the ocean. As AustCyber suggests, though in muted language, Australia does have huge resourcing holes in our cyber security education capability.

The most important gap in my view is the near total lack of university degree programs or professional education in advanced cyber operations, the near total lack of technical education facilities to support such programs, such as advanced cyber ranges, and a weakly developed national capability for complex cyber exercises.

What we should be doing

In 2018, I argued at a national conference sponsored by the government that Australia needs a national cyber war college, and a cyber civil reserve force, to drive our human capital development. I suggested at the time the college should be set up with a budget of A$100 million per year. Based on a recent international research workshop at UNSW Canberra, I have changed my estimate of cost and process.

Australia needs a cyber security education fund with an initial investment of around A$1 billion to support a new national cyber college. It should be networked around the entire country, and independent of control by any existing education institutions, but drawing on their expertise and that of the private sector.

It would serve as the battery of the nation for cyber security education of the future.




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Labor isn’t offering a better alternative

The Labor Party, through its cyber spokesperson Gai Brodtmann, has been critical of the government’s failure to fill the gaps. But she is retiring from the House of Representatives at the next election.

Labor has no well developed policies, and no budget commitments, that can address the gaps. There is even reason to believe the party doesn’t have a front bench that is engaged with the scope of the challenge. None of them seem to be as technologically oriented as Turnbull, the last cyber champion the Australian parliament may see for a while.The Conversation

Greg Austin, Professor UNSW Canberra Cyber, UNSW

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Why NZ needs to follow weapons ban with broad review of security laws


File 20190321 93032 1eqsodf.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1
Within a week of the Christchurch terror attacks, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has announced a ban on semi-automatic weapons.
AAP/David Alexander, CC BY-SA

John Battersby, Massey University

Up until Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s announcement of a ban on military-style weapons yesterday, New Zealand had a system of licensing firearms holders and used a process of application, vetting, reference checks and attendance at firearms safety lectures.

Knowledge of the Firearms Code was required and tested. A firearms license holder was able to then legally acquire any number of firearms. New Zealand has not set up an arms register since the Arms Act was enacted in 1983.

There is no tally of how many firearms are in New Zealand, and no log of how many firearms any individual may have. There is an estimated 1.3 million firearms legally owned in New Zealand, and nothing beyond speculation about how many illegal weapons have found their way in.

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announces a ban on military style semi-automatic weapons and assault firearms.



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Loop holes in gun laws

With a certain class of license, military style semi-automatic weapons (in unlimited numbers) could be acquired legally. Some 14,000 of these weapons are thought to be legally owned in New Zealand.

Loop holes in current legislation abound. These make it possible to modify weapons and obtain large magazines, and even to buy armour-piercing bullets. Why, in a peaceful, democratic and open society, does anyone need a military-style automatic weapon and armour piercing ammunition?

Prime Minister Ardern has shown the decisive leadership we should see from a leader who genuinely cares about the people she leads. She has finally grasped the nettle, exploiting the current situation to drive through the changes New Zealand should have made 23 years ago following the Port Arthur massacre. She has outwitted those who might oppose her move, because there is no argument that anybody could muster now that would in any way resonate with the vast majority of New Zealanders.

Ardern has announced the ban on a number of weapons, signalled changes to the firearms licensing regime and the need to keep tabs on the national recreational arsenal. But there is a tough road ahead.




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Rural, recreational use of firearms

Politicians have an unquestioning faith that legislation is sufficient, but it is largely impotent without adequate resourcing for the enforcement of new rules. With only an estimate to work on, New Zealand Police (the administrators of firearms regulations) will have to identify and locate the owners of these weapons and implement the buy-back and amnesty that will be required.

Many owners will give them up. Their humanity will outdo their desire to have them, but the shocking reality of panic buying of semi-automatics since the Christchurch tragedy signals that clearly there are those who will seek to subvert the government’s intent. Police will have to investigate those who fail to cooperate, safely seize the weapons and prosecute the offenders.

Most firearms license holders in New Zealand do not own military style semi-automatic weapons. Many are rural, recreational hunters or use their weapons on ranges. They look after their weapons responsibly, secure them safely, own them legally and use them at no risk to the general public.

Most who own semi-automatic weapons are no different. We should not demonise a section of society simply because of the horrific, obscene and brutally inhuman actions of one lonely individual who no more represents gun owners than he does any other group of New Zealanders.

Illegal weapon imports

But this is not the issue. The issue is that the privilege of owning a certain class of weapons is not worth the terrible cost of 50 people being gunned down in prayer. New Zealand is already seeing the steady illegal importation of firearms, often tied to the increasing movement of illicit narcotics. Banning semi-automatics will increase the demand for the importation of these weapons illegally, adding extra pressure on law enforcement agencies.




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For a ban on military style semi-automatics to have meaning, New Zealand’s long coast line, its airports and sea ports, through which illegal commodities are moving, will need resources that allow fit-for-purpose enforcement powers, people and tactics.

The changes New Zealand will now make will not guarantee it will be free of terrorism in the future. Other countries have much stricter firearms regulations, having taken far stronger measures years ago, but they have still suffered terrorist attacks. Firearms reform is one small step for a country that will need to address a plethora of gaps in its security approach.

New Zealand’s terrorism legislation is inadequate. It was found wanting when police attempted to apply it in 2007 during the “Urewera raids”, but charges could not be laid then. New Zealand’s then Solicitor General David Collins described the Terrorism Suppression Act then as incoherent and unworkable. How New Zealand manages social media needs review, and the traditional minimalist approach to national security will no longer suffice.

New Zealand has faced security crises before during the Russian scare in the 1880s and the second world war in the 1940s. It has often been caught out doing “too little, too late” to be saved only by its distance from any potential threat. The internet has extinguished that distance. It has brought the ills of the rest of the world to us. It is already too late. We must ensure that what we do now, is not too little.The Conversation

John Battersby, Police Teaching Fellow, Massey University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

What Parkland’s experience tells us about the limits of a ‘security’ response to Christchurch


Amanda Tattersall, University of Sydney

In the days before the mass shootings in Christchurch I was visiting Parkland, Florida, where 17 people were killed in a school shooting on Valentine’s Day 2018. I was recording a story about how those survivors and their allies built a global movement against gun violence. I met students, teachers and supporters.

These American students knew all about Australia’s gun laws. “How did you get such strong laws?” they would ask. And I would tell them about the Port Arthur massacre and how our conservative prime minister acted. “We haven’t had a gun massacre since,” I proclaimed. Days later, I felt shame at my hubris – an Australian has been charged with the shootings at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.




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Lessons from a ‘high-security’ suburb

We have so much to learn from Parkland. And it’s not simply how they built a remarkable social movement. Some lessons become visible only when you actually see the place.

Parkland is a suburb close to the Everglades, 30 minutes from the beach and an hour north of Miami. It is a wealthy, majority-white neighbourhood. But the thing that overwhelmed me when I was driving around is that it is a gated community.

The entire suburb is broken up into large blocks, and at the centre of each block is a single entrance for cars. The road has a security hut, large barriers stretching across and there is a large gate. You need a PIN code to go inside.

When you go through, the homes and streets are beautiful. Green grass, and every home has one of those white mailboxes with a red flag that turns up when the mail arrives.

These gated communities tell you something. Parents choose to live behind walls to create a nice way to live and keep their family safe.

But in Parkland all that security didn’t keep them safe. Darkness found a new way in – and everyone is still feeling the murderous pain.

The limits of security and walls offer a profound lesson for us in Australia as we work out how to respond to the terrorism in Christchurch. Prime Minister Scott Morrison wants to lock up our places of worship – particularly mosques. He wants police with guns and security checks. It’s like he wants to build religious gated communities.




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This approach is consistent with his other policies – use the navy to stop boats, use cages to stop refugees. Our prime minister has only one register – security.

But if Parkland showed anything, it’s that gated communities don’t stop violence. The violence just moves and shifts. An aggressive security response might make you “feel” safer, but it doesn’t make you safe.

At the same time, security heightens the tension. And it does nothing to deal with the causes of the violence.

So how do we respond to the causes of the violence? In Parkland, the main issue was access to guns. The March for Our Lives students called this out quickly. They gained traction because they bravely and forcefully condemned the National Rifle Association for creating the context for mass shootings – easy access to guns.




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It started with the demonisation of others

Our context is different. The issue in Christchurch was about guns, yes, but equally it was about motive. As Australians, one of our citizens “radicalised” themselves to such a point that they massacred other people. How did this happen?

White supremacy. OK, but how do we unpack white supremacy? Who emboldened this? Who made it OK to demonise Muslims – to say they don’t belong?

First, people looked to Pauline Hanson and Fraser Anning. The social movement around #EggBoy shows people’s anger at extremism.

But it’s more than that. Murdoch news media have been running a crusade against Muslims for years. The Coalition has brutalised Muslims and refugees for votes since September 11 2001. And the Labor Party has given bipartisan support to the offshore detention of predominantly Muslim refugees.




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Come together in love to overcome hate

But knowing who prosecutes hate is not enough. Hate can’t drive out hate. As Martin Luther King junior said, only love can do that.

How do we bring love into our work to stop race being used as a divisive power? I wish I had the answer. But I do know that building love is something that can happen everywhere all the time – not just at vigils or special services.

Can we build a movement that would amplify love at work, in our community, in our schools, where we have intentional conversations to talk about what Christchurch meant and why the Muslim community was targeted?

The Muslim community are in pain. We – especially white people like me and some of you – have to do the heavy lifting on this one. We can take the lead on doing something about white supremacy and dividing people by race and religion.

Imagine if we could take the pain of this moment and turn it into a real reckoning for our country. For as long as white people have stood in Australia we have caused harm to others. But too often we shrug off responsibility through phrases like “the most successful multicultural country in the world”. Or we get scared off the conversation by phrases like the “history wars”.

Yes, the shock jocks will berate and the trolls will yell. But let’s have them yell at white people taking on white supremacy instead of Muslim and other leaders of colour.

It’s time to act. The election is one place – we need to vote for leaders who stand with Muslims because “they are us”.

But this is more than just electoral politics. It’s about a movement committed to connection, understanding, listening, respect and love. And that’s love as a verb, love as action.

A year after the mass shooting, Parkland is still a torn community. Many are still deeply active in social movements pushing for gun law reform. And many others are still healing.

In Parkland the lesson is that they were forever changed, not because of the hate that was inflicted, but because of the love they cultivated in response.The Conversation

Amanda Tattersall, Postdoc in urban geography and Research Lead at Sydney Policy Lab. Host of ChangeMakers Podcast., University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Morrison announces $55 million for security at religious premises and warns against “tribalism”


Michelle Grattan, University of Canberra

Scott Morrison has warned against “tribalists” hijacking policy
arguments, declaring the migration issue “must not be appropriated as a proxy debate for racial, religious or ethnic sectarianism”.

In his address in the wake of the New Zealand attack, on the theme of managing differences, Morrison said it was not a matter of “disagreeing less, but disagreeing better”.

“When we disagree better, we engage with respect, rather than
questioning each other’s integrity and morality,” he told the
Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce in Melbourne.

“Tribalists constantly seek to appropriate legitimate policy issues and public concerns as a tool to promote their separatist and exclusive agendas. To contort and misrepresent disagreement in the worst possible terms,” the Prime Minister said.

He announced A$55 million for religious organisations to increase
security at their premises, including schools, and places of worship and assembly.

Grants will range from $50,000 to $1.5 million for enhancements
including CCTV cameras, lighting, fencing, bollards, alarms, security systems and public address systems.

On two charged and divisive political debates, Morrison stressed that dealing with population growth was a “practical policy challenge”, and claimed “I have never sought to question the compassionate motives of those who hold different views about the best way to manage Australia’s borders”.

He said that in Australia as in many other countries the “ties
that bind us are under new pressures and are at risk of breaking.

“If we allow a culture of ‘us and them’, of tribalism, to take hold; if we surrender an individual to be defined not by their own unique worth and contribution but by the tribe they are assigned to, if we yield to the compulsion to pick sides rather than happy coexistence, we will lose what makes diversity work in Australia,” he said.

“As debate becomes more fierce, the retreat to tribalism is
increasingly taking over, and for some, extremism takes hold.

“Reading only news that we agree with, interacting with people only we agree with, and having less understanding and grace towards others that we do not even know, making the worst possible assumptions about them and their motives, simply because we disagree with them.

“This is true of the left and the right. And even more so from those shouting from the fringes to a mainstream of quiet Australians that just want to get on with their lives.

“Hate, blame and contempt are the staples of tribalism, it is
consuming modern debate, egged on by an appetite for conflict as
entertainment, not so different from the primitive appetites of the colosseum days, with a similar corrosive impact on the fabric of our society”.

Morrison said tribalists sought to take over legitimate policy issues and public concerns, using them to promote their separatist agendas, contorting and misrepresenting disagreement.

A discussion of the annual migrant intake was “not a debate about the value or otherwise of multiculturalism or the economic contribution of migration,” he said.

“It must not be appropriated as a proxy debate for racial, religious or ethnic sectarianism.

“Just because Australians are frustrated about traffic jams and
population pressures encroaching on their quality of life, especially in this city, does not mean they are anti-migrant or racist,” he said.

“For the overwhelming majority of Australians concerned about this
issue, this is not and never would be their motivation”.

He said the worst example was “the despicable appropriation of
concerns about immigration as a justification for a terrorist
atrocity.

“Such views have rightly been denounced. But equally, so to must the imputation that the motivation for supporting moderated immigration levels is racial hatred.

“As Australians we need to stand against the militant and lazy group think that distorts our public debate, stand up for our individualism and seek to think better of each other”.

He said “extremism, or in a different form fundamentalism, is simply an inability to tolerate difference.

“It is to feel threatened by others who do not conform to your world view.

“And it takes many forms: religious extremism, secular extremism, and political extremism.

“Every terrorist attack has at its core a hatred of difference and a hatred about the choices and lives of others”.

Morrison said last week “mindless tribalism” ended the lives of 50
people in New Zealand.

“Tribalists always want to separate us, divide us, set one Australian against another.

As Prime Minister I want to continue to bring Australians together, not set them against one another”.

“I believe, not in a tribalism that divides, but in an us that unites.”

Morrison took up Jacinda Ardern’s phrase when she said of Muslims
“they are us”, and applied it to Australia.

He said:

  • Indigenous Australians are us

  • Immigrant Australians from all nationalities and backgrounds,
    including Chinese, Lebanese, Greek, Indian, Turkish, Vietnamese, just to name a few, are us

  • Muslim Australians are us

  • Christian Australians are us

  • Jewish Australians are us

  • Hindu Australians are us

  • atheist Australians are us

  • LGBTIQ Australians are us

  • whoever you vote for – us

  • older Australians are us

  • young Australians are us

  • female Australians are us

  • male Australians are us

  • regional Australians are us.

“From the bottom of Tasmania to the tip of Cape York, from Byron to Broome, all 25 million Australians are us.

“We belong to each other. We stand with each other. We must love and respect each other more. That’s what we must affirm today to fight the forces that will otherwise weaken our nation”.The Conversation

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Fingerprint and face scanners aren’t as secure as we think they are



File 20190304 110110 1tgw1we.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1
Biometric systems are increasingly used in our civil, commercial and national defence applications.
Shutterstock

Wencheng Yang, Edith Cowan University and Song Wang, La Trobe University

Despite what every spy movie in the past 30 years would have you think, fingerprint and face scanners used to unlock your smartphone or other devices aren’t nearly as secure as they’re made out to be.

While it’s not great if your password is made public in a data breach, at least you can easily change it. If the scan of your fingerprint or face – known as “biometric template data” – is revealed in the same way, you could be in real trouble. After all, you can’t get a new fingerprint or face.

Your biometric template data are permanently and uniquely linked to you. The exposure of that data to hackers could seriously compromise user privacy and the security of a biometric system.

Current techniques provide effective security from breaches, but advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are rendering these protections obsolete.




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How biometric data could be breached

If a hacker wanted to access a system that was protected by a fingerprint or face scanner, there are a number of ways they could do it:

  1. your fingerprint or face scan (template data) stored in the database could be replaced by a hacker to gain unauthorised access to a system

  2. a physical copy or spoof of your fingerprint or face could be created from the stored template data (with play doh, for example) to gain unauthorised access to a system

  3. stolen template data could be reused to gain unauthorised access to a system

  4. stolen template data could be used by a hacker to unlawfully track an individual from one system to another.

Biometric data need urgent protection

Nowadays, biometric systems are increasingly used in our civil, commercial and national defence applications.

Consumer devices equipped with biometric systems are found in everyday electronic devices like smartphones. MasterCard and Visa both offer credit cards with embedded fingerprint scanners. And wearable fitness devices are increasingly using biometrics to unlock smart cars and smart homes.

So how can we protect raw template data? A range of encryption techniques have been proposed. These fall into two categories: cancellable biometrics and biometric cryptosystems.




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In cancellable biometrics, complex mathematical functions are used to transform the original template data when your fingerprint or face is being scanned. This transformation is non-reversible, meaning there’s no risk of the transformed template data being turned back into your original fingerprint or face scan.

In a case where the database holding the transformed template data is breached, the stored records can be deleted. Additionally, when you scan your fingerprint or face again, the scan will result in a new unique template even if you use the same finger or face.

In biometric cryptosystems, the original template data are combined with a cryptographic key to generate a “black box”. The cryptographic key is the “secret” and query data are the “key” to unlock the “black box” so that the secret can be retrieved. The cryptographic key is released upon successful authentication.

AI is making security harder

In recent years, new biometric systems that incorporate AI have really come to the forefront of consumer electronics. Think: smart cameras with built-in AI capability to recognise and track specific faces.

But AI is a double-edged sword. While new developments, such as deep artificial neural networks, have enhanced the performance of biometric systems, potential threats could arise from the integration of AI.

For example, researchers at New York University created a tool called DeepMasterPrints. It uses deep learning techniques to generate fake fingerprints that can unlock a large number of mobile devices. It’s similar to the way that a master key can unlock every door.

Researchers have also demonstrated how deep artificial neural networks can be trained so that the original biometric inputs (such as the image of a person’s face) can be obtained from the stored template data.




Read more:
Facial recognition is increasingly common, but how does it work?


New data protection techniques are needed

Thwarting these types of threats is one of the most pressing issues facing designers of secure AI-based biometric recognition systems.

Existing encryption techniques designed for non AI-based biometric systems are incompatible with AI-based biometric systems. So new protection techniques are needed.

Academic researchers and biometric scanner manufacturers should work together to secure users’ sensitive biometric template data, thus minimising the risk to users’ privacy and identity.

In academic research, special focus should be put on two most important aspects: recognition accuracy and security. As this research falls within Australia’s science and research priority of cybersecurity, both government and private sectors should provide more resources to the development of this emerging technology.The Conversation

Wencheng Yang, Post Doctoral Researcher, Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University and Song Wang, Senior Lecturer, Engineering, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

How the next Australian government can balance security and compassion for asylum seekers



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Crossbenchers Kerryn Phelps, Julia Banks and Rebekah Sharkie celebrate the passing of the “Medivac” law through the House of Representatives.
AAP/Lukas Coch

Alex Reilly, University of Adelaide

This is part of a major series called Advancing Australia, in which leading academics examine the key issues facing Australia in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election and beyond. Read the other pieces in the series here.


With a rapidly changing climate and increased instability in the world order, patterns of people movement are likely to change dramatically in the future. It is not a tenable response to isolate Australia from the shocks of these changes.

Sadly, the politicisation of refugee policy since the Tampa crisis of 2001 indicates that our major political parties are incapable of the kind of honest and open decision-making that is required in this complex and vexed policy space. However, the passing of the Kerryn Phelps-led amendments to the Migration Act to facilitate medical evacuations from Manus Island and Nauru may point to a shift in the nation’s mood on the issue.

In the second half of the 20th century, Australia transformed the idea of itself into a multicultural nation. An important part of this story has been Australia’s contribution to the resettlement of refugees.

Australia was the first country outside Europe to accede to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Australia was also an early adopter of the 1967 protocol that extended the convention beyond Europe. Australia’s generous resettlement of refugees under the convention has reinforced its identity as a nation built on migrants.

Australia’s acceptance of refugees remained uncontroversial while the numbers of refugees could be strictly controlled through its immigration program. The first serious challenge to control was the arrival of boatloads of Vietnamese refugees in 1976. However, the Fraser Coalition government maintained control through an arrangement with South East Asian countries that Australia would resettle a high number of Vietnamese refugees if those countries stopped redirecting boats that arrived on their shores back out to sea.

How the Tampa changed Australian asylum-seeker policy

When boats began arriving in larger numbers from 1999 to 2001, the struggling Howard Coalition government used the rescue of 438 asylum seekers by the MV Tampa as an opportunity to implement a more restrictive policy. This included boat turn-backs, offshore processing and detention, and issuing temporary protection visas for people arriving by boat whose applications for asylum were accepted. The boats stopped arriving within months.




Read more:
Australian politics explainer: the MV Tampa and the transformation of asylum-seeker policy


In 2007, the Labor government dismantled these policy settings. Asylum seekers arriving by boat were rescued at sea and processed on the Australian territory of Christmas Island. If they were found to be refugees, they were granted permanent protection visas. This policy was premised on boat arrivals being at similar levels to those experienced previously. But this proved mistaken.

The Norwegian cargo ship Tampa collected 438 stranded asylum seekers and changed Australian policy on the issue.
AAP/Wallenius Wilhelmsen

By 2013, refugee policy was in disarray. In 2012, 17,204 people arrived by boat, rising to 20,587 in 2013. This far outnumbered the planned refugee intake of 13,750 and reinforced the fear that Australia was in danger of being “swamped” by asylum seekers.

Prior to this rapid rise in boat arrivals, the Labor government had attempted to introduce a novel policy response, the Australia-Malaysia asylum-seeker transfer agreement. The Malaysian government agreed to the return to Malaysia of asylum seekers who tried to reach Australia by boat via Indonesia. Malaysia guaranteed housing, education and work rights for these asylum seekers, but also that they would receive no advantage in resolving their application for refugee resettlement.

This arrangement removed the incentive to take a risky boat journey to Australia.
We will never know if it would have stopped the boats, as the High Court held the government did not have the power to implement the arrangement, and the Coalition and the Greens blocked an attempt by the government to amend the Migration Act to provide it with the requisite power.

In mid-2013, the Labor government changed direction radically. It committed to offshore processing for the first time, stating categorically that no asylum seeker reaching Australia by boat would ever be resettled here.

When it was returned to government in 2013, the Abbott Coalition government readily adopted Labor’s policy and added a policy of aggressive boat turn-backs covered in a veil of operational secrecy. It also reintroduced temporary protection visas for the 30,000 asylum seekers who had entered Australia during the six years of Labor government. Within a few months, boat arrivals had ceased completely.

Asylum-seeker policy becomes a national security issue

The current Coalition government has successfully cast refugee policy as an issue of border security. The ministers for immigration, first Scott Morrison and then Peter Dutton, have spun a narrative that any softening of the government’s stance on resettlement would risk relaunching a flotilla of boats.

The line they have drawn is breathtaking in its strictness. The government has been unwilling even to accept New Zealand’s offer to resettle 150 refugees a year from offshore detention for fear they will then have backdoor entry to Australia. It has also made it very difficult for asylum seekers to get emergency medical treatment in Australia.

The government’s narrative of border protection does not acknowledge the human cost of long-term offshore detention. Since detention centres on Nauru and Manus were opened in 2014, 3,127 people have been transferred there. As of early February 2019, as a result of third-country resettlements and voluntary returns, about 1,000 remain. The last children on Nauru were resettled in the US in February 2019.




Read more:
As children are airlifted from Nauru, a cruel and inhumane policy may finally be ending


Despite strictly controlling access to information from Nauru and Manus, the government has not been able to prevent courageous medical officials bearing witness to the human suffering of refugees. This includes suicides and self-harm, and children simply giving up. It has not been able to prevent Behrouz Boochani using mobile phone messages to write an award-winning book bearing witness to the official strategies used to break the spirit of refugees on Manus Island.

Asylum seeker and journalist Behrouz Boochani wrote the award-winning book No Friend but the Mountains.
Amnesty International handout

Finding a more humane way forward

As on so many policy issues facing Australia, we need an honest discussion on refugees. On the one hand, it needs to be acknowledged that refugees are victims of regimes intent on persecuting them and are deserving (and entitled) to our protection.

As a nation, we continue to have a policy of high levels of immigration, and refugees can be a significant part of our strategy for future prosperity. We have a responsibility not to contribute further to people’s suffering, and thus long-term detention of refugees is untenable.

On the other hand, Australians believe they are entitled to determine who is provided access to the benefit of membership in the Australian state. This being the case, refugee policy must be able to control the number of people who are accepted for resettlement. The most effective mechanism of control is to prevent onshore arrivals by boat and plane, and to use planned resettlement from refugee camps in consultation with the UNHCR.

The unprecedented number of boat arrivals in 2012-13 tilted the equation towards control over compassion. However, there is a sensible middle ground more in line with Australian values.

First, it is possible to resettle all the asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus in Australia expeditiously, without triggering large numbers of boat arrivals. This resettlement must be the immediate priority of a new government. It was never envisaged that refugees would spend up to six years in offshore detention.

Retaining the architecture of offshore detention and processing for the future and the possibility of boat turn-backs is more than adequate deterrent to prevent people risking the perilous journey to Australia by boat. The Coalition governments in 2001 and 2013 demonstrated that if this proves to be wrong, introducing a hard-line policy can stop the boats very quickly.

Second, all those refugees on Temporary Protection Visas and Safe Haven Enterprise Visas in Australia need to be offered permanent protection. Temporary visas create a huge psychological and social burden on refugees in Australia, with no benefits.

Third, the movement of refugees, particularly from the Middle East, through South East Asia to Australia is a regional problem. The Australian government needs to resume discussions with Indonesia and Malaysia about a more nuanced solution.

With the Coalition cutting through with its narrative of fear of invasion and Labor still spooked by policy failure during its previous term in government, it has taken independent MPs to begin to push Australian refugee policy to a sensible middle ground.

Kerryn Phelps’ amendment to the Migration Act, supported by Labor and the Greens, provides for the evacuation of asylum seekers and refugees to Australia if two doctors assess that they require medical treatment not available on Nauru or Manus Island. The minister for home affairs retains the power to reject a transfer on security grounds. The law is also limited in its application to refugees already on Nauru and Manus Island.

In parliament, Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Opposition Leader Bill Shorten framed their positions on the “Medivac” law as a test of character. Morrison focused on the importance of “mettle” and “holding the line”. Shorten focused on “compassion” and “balance”.

The passing of the law ensures refugee policy will be a key election issue once again. The Australian people will determine what version of character prevails.The Conversation

Alex Reilly, Director of the Public Law and Policy Research Unit, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Seven ways the government can make Australians safer – without compromising online privacy



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We need a cyber safety equivalent to the Slip! Slop! Slap! campaign to nudge behavioural change in the community.
Shutterstock

Damien Manuel, Deakin University

This is part of a major series called Advancing Australia, in which leading academics examine the key issues facing Australia in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election and beyond. Read the other pieces in the series here.

When it comes to data security, there is an inherent tension between safety and privacy. The government’s job is to balance these priorities with laws that will keep Australians safe, improve the economy and protect personal data from unwarranted surveillance.

This is a delicate line to walk. Recent debate has revolved around whether technology companies should be required to help law enforcement agencies gain access to the encrypted messages of suspected criminals.

While this is undoubtedly an important issue, the enacted legislation – the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act – fails on both fronts. Not only is it unlikely to stop criminals, it could make personal communications between everyday people less secure.

Rather than focus on the passage of high-profile legislation that clearly portrays a misunderstanding of the technology in question, the government would do better to invest in a comprehensive cyber security strategy that will actually have an impact.

Achieving the goals set out in the strategy we already have would be a good place to start.




Read more:
The difference between cybersecurity and cybercrime, and why it matters


Poor progress on cyber security

The Turnbull government launched Australia’s first Cyber Security Strategy in April 2016. It promised to dramatically improve the online safety of all Australian families and businesses.

In 2017, the government released the first annual update to report on how well it was doing. On the surface some progress had been made, but a lot of items were incomplete – and the promised linkages to businesses and the community were not working well.

Unfortunately, there was never a second update. Prime ministers were toppled, cabinets were reshuffled and it appears the Morrison government lost interest in truly protecting Australians.

So, where did it all go wrong?

A steady erosion of privacy

Few Australians paid much notice when vested interests hijacked technology law reforms. The amendment of the Copyright Act in 2015 forced internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to sites containing pirated content. Movie studios now had their own version of China’s “Great Firewall” to block and control internet content in Australia.

In 2017, the government implemented its data retention laws, which effectively enabled specific government agencies to spy on law-abiding citizens. The digital trail (metadata) people left through phone calls, SMS messages, emails and internet activity was retained by telecommunications carriers and made accessible to law enforcement.

The public was assured only limited agencies would have access to the data to hunt for terrorists. In 2018, we learned that many more agencies were accessing the data than originally promised.

Enter the Assistance and Access legislation. Australia’s technology sector strongly objected to the bill, but the Morrison government’s consultation process was a whitewash. The government ignored advice on the damage the legislation would do to the developing cyber sector outlined in the Cyber Security Strategy – the very sector the Turnbull government had been counting on to help rebuild the economy in this hyper-connected digital world.




Read more:
What skills does a cybersecurity professional need?


While the government focuses on the hunt for terrorists, it neglects the thousands of Australians who fall victim each year to international cybercrime syndicates and foreign governments.

Australians lose money to cybercrime via scam emails and phone calls designed to harvest passwords, banking credentials and other personal information. Losses from some categories of cybercrime have increased by more than 70% in the last 12 months. The impact of cybercrime on Australian business and individuals is estimated at $7 billion a year.

So, where should government focus its attention?

Seven actions that would make Australia safer

If the next government is serious about protecting Australian businesses and families, here are seven concrete actions it should take immediately upon taking office.

1. Review the Cyber Security Strategy

Work with industry associations, the business and financial sectors, telecommunication providers, cyber startups, state government agencies and all levels of the education sector to develop a plan to protect Australians and businesses. The plan must be comprehensive, collaborative and, most importantly, inclusive. It should be adopted at the federal level and by states and territories.

2. Make Australians a harder target for cybercriminals

The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre is implementing technical and process controls that help people in the UK fight cybercrime in smart, innovative ways. The UK’s Active Cyber Defence program uses top-secret intelligence to prevent cyber attacks and to detect and block malicious email campaigns used by scammers. It also investigates how people actually use technology, with the aim of implementing behavioural change programs to improve public safety.

3. Create a community education campaign

A comprehensive community education program would improve online behaviours and make businesses and families safer. We had the iconic Slip! Slop! Slap! campaign from 1981 to help reduce skin cancer through community education. Where is the equivalent campaign for cyber safety to nudge behavioural change in the community at all levels from kids through to adults?

4. Improve cyber safety education in schools

Build digital literacy into education from primary through to tertiary level so that young Australians understand the consequences of their online behaviours. For example, they should know the risks of sharing personal details and nude selfies online.




Read more:
Cybersecurity of the power grid: A growing challenge


5. Streamline industry certifications

Encourage the adoption of existing industry certifications, and stop special interest groups from introducing more. There are already more than 100 industry certifications. Minimum standards for government staff should be defined, including for managers, technologists and software developers.

The United States Defence Department introduced minimum industry certification for people in government who handle data. The Australian government should do the same by picking a number of vendor-agnostic certifications as mandatory in each job category.

6. Work with small and medium businesses

The existing cyber strategy doesn’t do enough to engage with the business sector. Small and medium businesses form a critical part of the larger business supply-chain ecosystem, so the ramifications of a breach could be far-reaching.

The Australian Signals Directorate recommends businesses follow “The Essential Eight” – a list of strategies businesses can adopt to reduce their risk of cyber attack. This is good advice, but it doesn’t address the human side of exploitation, called social engineering, which tricks people into disclosing passwords that protect sensitive or confidential information.

7. Focus on health, legal and tertiary education sectors

The health, legal and tertiary education sectors have a low level of cyber maturity. These are among the top four sectors reporting breaches, according to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.

While health sector breaches could lead to personal harm and blackmail, breaches in the legal sector could result in the disclosure of time-sensitive business transactions and personal details. And the tertiary education sector – a powerhouse of intellectual research – is ripe for foreign governments to steal the knowledge underpinning Australia’s future technologies.

A single person doing the wrong thing and making a mistake can cause a major security breach. More than 900,000 people are employed in the Australian health and welfare sector, and the chance of one of these people making a mistake is unfortunately very high.The Conversation

Damien Manuel, Director, Centre for Cyber Security Research & Innovation (CSRI), Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

We’ve been hacked – so will the data be weaponised to influence election 2019? Here’s what to look for


Michael Jensen, University of Canberra

Prime Minister Scott Morrison recently said both the Australian Parliament and its major political parties were hacked by a “sophisticated state actor.”

This raises concerns that a foreign adversary may be intending to weaponise, or strategically release documents, with an eye towards altering the 2019 election outcome.




Read more:
A state actor has targeted Australian political parties – but that shouldn’t surprise us


While the hacking of party and parliamentary systems is normally a covert activity, influence operations are necessarily noisy and public in order to reach citizens – even if efforts are made to obscure their origins.

If a state actor has designs to weaponise materials recently hacked, we will likely see them seek to inflame religious and ethnic differences, as well as embarrass the major parties in an effort to drive votes to minor parties.

If this comes to pass, there are four things Australians should look for.

1. Strategic interest for a foreign government to intervene

If the major parties have roughly the same policy position in relation to a foreign country, a foreign state would have little incentive to intervene, for example, in favour of Labor against the Coalition.

They may, however, attempt to amplify social divisions between the parties as a way of reducing the ability of Australians to work together after the election.

They may also try to drive down the already low levels of support for democracy and politicians in Australia to further undermine Australian democracy.

Finally, they may also try to drive the vote away from the major parties to minor parties which might be more favourable to their agenda.

This could be achieved by strategically releasing hacked materials which embarrass the major parties or their candidates, moving voters away from those parties and towards minor parties. These stories will likely be distributed first on social media platforms and later amplified by foreign and domestic broadcast media.

It is no secret that Russia and China seek a weakening of the Five Eyes security relationship between Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. If weakened, that would undermine the alliance structure which has helped prevent major wars for the last 70 years.

2. Disproportionate attention by foreign media to a local campaign

In the US, although Tulsi Gabbard’s polling numbers rank her near the bottom of declared and anticipated candidates for the Democratic nomination, she has received significant attention from Russia’s overt or “white” propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today).

The suspected reason for this attention is that some of her foreign policy positions on the Middle East are consistent with Russian interests in the region.

In Australia, we might find greater attention than normal directed at One Nation or Fraser Anning – as well as the strategic promotion of Green candidates in certain places to push political discussion further right and further left at the same time.

3. Promoted posts on Facebook and other social media platforms

Research into the 2016 US election found widespread violations of election law. The vast majority of promoted ads on Facebook during the election campaign were from groups which failed to file with the Federal Election Commission and some of this unregistered content came from Russia.

Ads placed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency, which is under indictment by the Mueller investigation, ended up disproportionately in the newsfeeds of Facebook users in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania – two of the three states that looked like a lock for Clinton until the very end of the campaign.

What makes Facebook and many other social media platforms particularly of concern is the ability to use data to target ads using geographic and interest categories. One can imagine that if a foreign government were armed with voting data hacked from the parties, this process would be all the more effective.




Read more:
New guidelines for responding to cyber attacks don’t go far enough


Seats in Australia which might be targeted include seats like Swan (considered a marginal seat with competition against the Liberals on both the left and the right) and the seats of conservative politicians on GetUp’s “hitlist” – such as Tony Abbott’s and Peter Dutton’s seats of Warringah and Dickson.

4. Focus on identity manipulation, rather than fake news

The term “fake news” suffers from conceptual ambiguities – it means different things to different people. “Fake news” has been used not just as a form of classification to describe material which “mimics news media content in form but not in organisational process or intent” but also used to describe satire and even as an epithet used to dismiss disagreeable claims of a factual nature.

Studies of propaganda show that information need not be factually false to effectively manipulate target audiences.

The best propaganda uses claims which are factually true, placing them into a different context which can be used to manipulate audiences or by amplifying negative aspects of a group, policy or politician, without placing that information in a wider context.

For example, to amplify concerns about immigrants, one might highlight the immigrant background of someone convicted of a crime, irrespective of the overall propensity for immigrants to commit crimes compared to native born Australians.

This creates what communication scholars call a “representative anecdote” through which people come to understand and think about a topic with which they are otherwise unfamiliar. While immigrants may or may not be more likely to commit crimes than other Australians, the reporting creates that association.

Among the ways foreign influence operations function is through the politicisation of identities. Previous research has found evidence of efforts to heighten ethnic and racial differences through Chinese language WeChat official accounts operating in Australia as well as through Russian trolling efforts which have targeted Australia. This is the same pattern followed by Russia during the 2016 US election.

Liberal democracies are designed to handle conflicts over interests through negotiation and compromise. Identities, however, are less amenable to compromise. These efforts may not be “fake news” but they are effective in undermining the capacity of a democratic nation to mobilise its people in pursuit of common goals.




Read more:
How digital media blur the border between Australia and China


The Russian playbook

No country is immune from the risk of foreign influence operations. While historically these operations might have involved the creation of false documents and on the ground operations in target countries, today materials can be sourced, faked, and disseminated from the relative security of the perpetrating country. They may include both authentic and faked documents – making it hard for a campaign to charge that certain documents are faked without affirming the validity of others.

Most importantly, in a digitally connected world, these operations can scale up quickly and reach substantially larger populations than previously possible.

While the Russian interference in the 2016 US election has received considerable attention, Russia is not the only perpetrator and the US is not the only target.

But the Russians created a playbook which other countries can readily draw upon and adapt. The question remains as to who that might be in an Australian context.The Conversation

Michael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.