Why China’s attempts to stifle foreign media criticism are likely to fail


Tony Walker, La Trobe UniversityWhen China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, summoned journalists to the Chinese embassy last week, this was not an occasion for polite exchanges on a troubled relationship between Beijing and Canberra.

Cheng was intent on communicating a forceful message to Australian reporters that China was intent on fighting back against what it regards as a great wall of unfavourable publicity about its treatment of its Uyghur minority.

In some media reporting of the press conference, the exercise was referred to as a “charm offensive”. However, a more accurate characterisation would be to describe it as an attempt by China to draw a line under increasingly negative foreign reporting of its activities.

This reporting is having real world consequences for China’s image abroad. It is inviting pushback from an international community that is mobilising against Chinese overreach. Beijing will not be insensitive to the risks of brand damage to China’s reputation, or risks of sanctions.

The Biden administration’s canvassing of a potential boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in China will have got Beijing’s attention. If countries, led by the United States, stay away this would represent a significant loss of face.

Global campaign against unfavourable reporting

Senior Chinese officials and Uyghurs appeared via video during Cheng’s embassy briefing to refute media accounts of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region as “Western lies”, “fabrications” and the work of “anti-China forces”.

In its propaganda offensive, China has not been averse to using the “fake news” label, popularised by former US President Donald Trump to assail its critics.

Cheng’s press conference was part of a larger, global campaign against unfavorable reporting in which Beijing has resorted to a combination of bluster and in some cases reprisals against journalists who have cut too close to the bone.

Australian citizen Cheng Lei appears to be a case in point. Cheng, an anchor for state broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN), was detained in China last year without explanation, but now stands accused of ill-defined national security breaches.




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In private social media posts, she had criticised China’s initial response to the coronavirus pandemic. It is not clear whether this is the basis of allegations against her, but no other reasonable explanation has been forthcoming to this point.

China appears to have been particularly displeased by the reporting of the BBC. In February, Beijing banned all BBC broadcasting in China in retaliation for British authorities having revoked the license of the Chinese overseas broadcaster, CGTN. This represented a significant escalation in the conflict between the Chinese authorities and Western media.

What Chinese propaganda is seeking to achieve

Cheng’s propaganda exercise should therefore be seen as part of a global campaign to stifle what China regards as unfair and damaging criticism of its policies at home and abroad under paramount leader Xi Jinping.

If this Canberra media event was designed to dampen negative reporting in the Australian media, however, the campaign is unlikely to work for the simple reason there is little, or no, sign of Beijing reversing its antagonistic behaviour towards Western media.




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Despite China’s denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should be called what it is: cultural genocide


Scarcely a day passes without criticism of foreign media in Chinese state-controlled outlets. These attacks underscore the gap that exists between Western perceptions of the role of journalists in democratic societies and China’s view that media should serve the interests of the state.

Typical of the sort of criticism levelled at Western media is the following contribution to the nationalistic Global Times by a professor of international relations at Shanghai’s Fudan University.

What some media have done is exaggerate Chinese authorities’ fault in a bid to overthrow the Chinese system. Take the BBC. This British media outlet did not call on the British public to overthrow the British government even if it has miserably failed to effectively curb the spread of COVID-19. This is double standards.

This level of naivete is hard to credit, but it is revealing nevertheless of the gap that exists between Chinese views of the Western media and vice versa.

China’s bluster against Western media may play to nationalist sentiment at home, but it is hardly likely to be effective in neutralising foreign media criticism.

Australian media will not stop providing a platform for legitimate and widely publicised concerns about China’s mistreatment of its minorities; its disrespect for the “one country, two systems” agreements it signed with the UK to facilitate the handover of Hong Kong; its threatening behaviour towards Taiwan; and its expansion of base facilities in disputed waters of the South China Sea.

Beijing’s trade war against Australia smacks of the sort of overreach that may have become a staple of Chinese propaganda in state-run media, but in reality this is not a campaign that serves China’s own interests.

That is assuming Beijing is concerned about promoting itself as a reasonably constructive citizen in its own Indo-Pacific neighborhood.

China’s dismal treatment of journalists

China’s press freedom record leaves a lot to be desired.

In the latest Reporters Without Borders world press freedom index, China rated 177 out of 180. It is by far the world’s largest captor of journalists with at least 121 detained, some in life-threatening conditions.

In March, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China reported an intensification of harassment of foreign reporters and increased use of “visa weaponisation”. This had led to the expulsion of 18 foreign correspondents in the first half of 2020. Others, like ABC’s Bill Birtles and the Australian Financial Review’s Michael Smith left because of concerns about being detained..

China regards the FCCC as an “illegal” organisation. As Cedric Alviani, Reporters Without Borders’s East Asian bureau head, said,

In recent years, Chinese regime apparatus has come to consider foreign correspondents as unwanted witnesses and goes to great length to prevent them from collecting information that doesn’t mirror its propaganda.

In a 2019 survey of the 10 “most censored” countries in the world by the Committee to Protect Journalists, China rated fifth behind only Eritrea, North Korea, Turkmenistan and Saudi Arabia. It said,

China has the world’s most extensive and sophisticated censorship apparatus. […] Since 2017, no website or social media account is allowed to provide a news service on the internet without the Cyberspace Administration of China’s permission. Internet users are blocked from foreign search engines, news websites, and social media platforms by the Great Firewall. […] Foreign social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are banned.

This is the lived reality for foreign journalists in China in the Xi era, and for Chinese consumers of uncensored news, for that matter.




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At no other stage since China began opening to the outside world in the Deng Xiaoping era of the late 1970s have conditions for foreign correspondents in China been more threatening — or more counterproductive from Beijing’s point of view.

China’s war against the foreign media is at a tangent to its proclaimed ambition to continue opening its economy to foreign investment. The anti-Western media campaign jars with hopes that it would become a responsible international stakeholder, as well.

If Ambassador Cheng’s press conference marks a new stage in China’s battles with foreign media, this promises to be a long march.The Conversation

Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor’s fellow, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

‘America First’ is no more, but can president-elect Biden fix the US reputation abroad?



Jacquelyn Martin/AP

Gorana Grgic, University of Sydney

Throughout the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency, Joe Biden spent significant time reassuring American allies around the world that Trump’s America is not “who we are” and pledging “we’ll be back”.

Now that he’s the president-elect, those who were most worried about another four years of “America First” foreign policy are no doubt breathing a sigh of relief.

Much has been written about a Biden presidency being focused on restoration, or as David Graham of The Atlantic put it,

returning the United States to its rightful place before (as he sees it) the current president came onto the scene and trashed the joint.

Then-Vice President Biden meeting Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2013.
LINTAO ZHANG / POOL /EPA

The old world order doesn’t exist anymore

This idea has revolved around restoring the post-1945 liberal international order – a term subject to a lot of academic contention. The US played a central role in creating and leading the order around key institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the like.

However, there is now no shortage of evidence that many of these institutions have come under extreme strain in recent years and have been unable respond to the challenges of the 21st century geopolitics.

For one, the US no longer wields the relative economic power or influence it had in the middle of last century. There are also increasingly vocal critics in the US — led by Trump — who question America’s foreign commitments.

Trump questioned the US commitment to NATO and expressed affinity for Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
Hau Dinh/AP

Moreover, nations themselves are no longer the only important actors in the international system. Terror groups like the Islamic State now have the ability to threaten global security, while corporations like Alphabet, Amazon, Apple and Facebook have such economic power, their combined revenue would qualify them for the G20.

Equally, the so-called liberal international order was built on the idea that a growing number of democracies would be willing to work within institutions like the UN, IMF and WTO and act in ways that would make everyone in the system better off.

Clearly, that has not been the case for the past 15 years as democracies around the world slowly eroded, from European Union states like Hungary and Poland to Brazil to the US.




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Biden can’t fix everything at once

Trump’s 2016 election seemed to have been the final nail in the coffin for the idea of a truly liberal international order with the US as a benevolent leader.

From his first days in office, Trump was on a mission to roll back US commitments to myriad organisations, deals and relationships around the world. Most significantly, this included questioning commitments to its closest allies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere that had been unwavering for generations.

Trump damaged some of America’s strongest alliances in Europe.
Francisco Seco/AP

Biden takes over at a precarious time. The world is more unstable than it has been in decades and the US image has been severely damaged by the actions and rhetoric of his predecessor.

There is no naivety on Biden’s part that he will be able to fix everything that was broken along the way. After all, many of these challenges predated Trump and are merely a reflection of a changing world.

Furthermore, Biden will have many pressing domestic issues that will demand his immediate attention — first and foremost addressing the greatest public health and economic crisis in a century.

We are also likely to see growing pressure for Biden to pursue a more progressive climate policy and a better-managed industrial policy, though he’ll be greatly constrained in what he can do if the Republicans maintain control of the Senate.

All of this will limit both his bandwidth and appetite for an overly ambitious foreign policy agenda.




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Rejoining the world, with managed expectations

Given this, Biden’s presidency should be approached with managed expectations. Unlike President Barack Obama, he did not campaign on lofty promises of change. He ran on being the opposite of Trump and, as such, being better able to understand the intricacies of foreign policy.

This will mean a swift return to multilateralism and rejoining the deals and organisations Trump abandoned, from the Paris climate agreement and Iran nuclear deal to the the World Trade Organisation and World Health Organisation.

Given these moves by Trump required no congressional input, Biden will be able to return to Obama-era policies in a relatively straightforward fashion through executive action.

However, this didn’t produce the expected “blue wave” and national repudiation of Trumpism, so it remains to be seen whether friends and foes alike can be convinced the past four years were an aberration. In essence, how good can America’s word be moving forward?

Biden’s campaign put a great emphasis on strengthening America’s existing alliances and forging new ones to maintain what he frequently refers to as “a free world”.

This will involve a substantial change from the way Trump managed US alliances, nurturing relationships with authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, for example, and some of the least liberal eastern European states.

This shift will benefit America’s traditional allies in western Europe the most. However, these countries are more determined than ever to stop depending on the whims of the Electoral College to decide their security. Instead, they are strengthening their own defence capabilities.

‘America First’ finished second

Lastly, on the greatest geopolitical question of our time, there is no doubt the US will continue its competition with China in the coming years, no matter who is president.

Yet, there are still plenty of questions around how Biden will handle this relationship. His campaign adopted a much more hawkish stance toward China compared to the Obama administration, which reflects a growing bipartisan consensus the US must get tougher with Beijing.




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At the same time, there is significant debate about how far his administration should push Beijing on issues ranging from technological competition to human rights, particularly given Biden has said the US needs to find a way to cooperate with China on other pressing issues, such as climate change, global health and arms control.

America might be coming back under Biden, but this is not the same world or the same country it once was. So, while the restoration of the US will be challenging, one thing is certain: “America First” finished second.The Conversation

Gorana Grgic, Lecturer in US Politics and Foreign Policy, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Morrison government toughens foreign investment scrutiny to protect ‘national security’


Michelle Grattan, University of Canberra

The Morrison government will significantly strengthen its scrutiny of foreign investment to protect sensitive national security technology and information and further ring fence the nation’s critical infrastructure.

It will insert a new “national security test” on bids, in a sweeping overhaul of the foreign investment regime.

The action follows mounting public concern about Chinese investment, although the government – already under harsh criticism from China – will seek to play down suggestions it relates to any one country, and point out it has been a long time in the pipeline.

Planned new legislation will also strengthen compliance provisions to ensure foreign investors follow conditions attached to approvals.

During the pandemic, all foreign investment bids are being scrutinised to ensure unfair advantage is not taken of distressed companies.

But in normal circumstances those under certain thresholds escape examination by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), the body that makes recommendations to the treasurer.

While all bids from foreign governments are screened, most private investments under $275 million – or $1.2 billion if the country has a free trade agreement with Australia, as China and a number of other major trading partners do – are not scrutinised.

The government is concerned investments in some very sensitive sectors are escaping screening even when there are national security concerns. Of particular worry is the vulnerability of small and medium sized companies that have specialised expertise, but fall below the threshold in value.

Under the new test, foreign investors will have to notify FIRB if they propose to start or acquire an interest – generally 10% or a position of control – in a “sensitive national security business”.

This will mean all foreign investments in sensitive national security businesses will be examined.

Businesses which raise sensitive national security concerns are those involved in critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy, ports and water, as well as those which service defence and national security organisations.

The national security test will also involve new powers.

The treasurer will be able to “call in” an investment before, during or after an acquisition for review if it raises risks which were not picked up earlier.

The treasurer will also have a new “last resort” power enabling them to apply or vary conditions or order disposal of an investment where national security concerns emerge after approval. This last resort power would not be retrospective – it would only apply to future approvals under the revised regime.

The government will release draft legislation next month for consultations. It wants it passed this year, to apply from January 1 next year.

It is estimated the new security arrangements will affect only a very small proportion of total foreign investment.

The tougher compliance measures follow complaints that some foreign investors ignore the conditions that are attached to approved bids. Recently fingers were pointed at Alinta for not implementing conditions about information storage. The company was told to comply.

Increasingly, conditions have been applied to allow bids to pass. In 2018-19, 4149 applications were approved with conditions attached. This was 47.6% of total approvals. By value, more than 80% of investment was approved subject to conditions.

The government says the monitoring and enforcement powers of Treasury and the Australian Taxation Office need expansion because of the extensive use of conditions and “emerging risks caused by global developments and rapid advances in technology”.

It notes that apart from residential property investments, the treasurer’s enforcement powers are limited to taking civil action or seeking a criminal prosecution. This inhibits the government’s ability to respond proportionately, for example to a minor breach.

Under the changes, the government will have a wider range of tools for enforcement, including access to premises to collect information and powers to give directions to investors in order to prevent or address suspected breaches.

While most of the announced changes are about toughening the scrutiny regime, the government will at the same time streamline the approval process for investments that do not raise national interest concerns.

Aware of the need to attract passive investment as part of the post COVID recovery, it will narrow the definition of a foreign government investor to exclude certain passive investments in funds where the investors have no influence over the investment or operational decisions of the entity.,

The government is committing $54 million over four years to step up compliance and monitoring capability. Funding will go to Treasury, the ATO and “relevant agencies such as the Department of Home Affairs”.

Treasurer Josh Frydenberg said the changes were the most significant made to the foreign investment regime since it was introduced in 1975.

“The reforms will ensure that our foreign investment regime is able to respond to emerging risks and global developments,” he said.

“Through the introduction of a new national security test, stronger enforcement powers and enhanced compliance obligations, we will ensure that Australia can continue to benefit from foreign investment while safeguarding our national interest.”

The reforms were developed with the support of FIRB whose chairman David Irvine has a national security background, including as head of ASIO.

Irvine said the package “appropriately addresses increasing risks to the national interest whilst ensuring Australia remains welcoming and open to foreign investment”.The Conversation

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

COVID-19 increases risk to international students’ mental health. Australia urgently needs to step up



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Hannah Soong, University of South Australia

The Victorian and ACT governments in recent days released support packages for international students facing hardship due to COVID-19.

Victoria has committed A$45 million under which international students could be eligible for relief payments of up to $1,100, co-contributed by Victorian universities. The ACT has committed A$450,000 to support vulnerable people on temporary visas and international students without income due to COVID-19.

The Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia all have varying amounts of help available for international students – whether it be one-off payments, free mental health support or help with food and shelter.

These moves by the states are in stark contrast to the federal government. International students, most of whom are on temporary visas, have been excluded from the goverment’s A$130 billion stimulus package. And Prime Minister Scott Morrison said international students unable to support themselves could return to their home countries.

Such comments can put a sizeable dent in Australia’s international education reputation. The way Australia supports international students studying here now may cement its global reputation as a country of choice to study.

Recent reports show Australia’s competitors for international students – Britain, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland – have offered support to those in hardship. This includes access to government welfare and flexibility on visas.




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Even before this pandemic, international students were exposed to several unique hardships. These are compounded by COVID-19.

Not only are they stranded in a foreign country unable or unsure about going home, many have no or little support from family or close friends in Australia.

It is therefore critical for Australian universities to act collectively, swiftly and decisively to provide a model of care for international students’ well-being. And it’s important for the Prime Minister to show he understands their unique vulnerabilities.

How international students are vulnerable

There is a perception that the majority of Chinese international students come from wealthy households. But a study of 652 Chinese students revealed significant differences in both demographics and backgrounds, as well as sources of funding for their studies.

While the majority (67%) had their studies funded by parents, 17% funded them through personal savings. The majority of self-financed students experienced added emotional and psychological challenges during their studies overseas.

Chinese students make up the majority (around 40%) of international students in Australia, but tens of thousands also come from other Asian countries including India, Nepal, Vietnam and Pakistan.

About half of international students, who are private renters, rely on work to pay rent. Like many, they too have lost their jobs in the COVID-19 pandemic – but they are not eligible for JobKeeper wage subsidies.

On March 30, Scott Morrison announced the National Cabinet had agreed to put in place a six-month moratorium on evictions.

This helps but is only one part of the rental issue for international students. Many international students enrolled in Australia for study, are unable to return to their homeland. Nor are they allowed to break their leases early without penalty.

The spread of this coronavirus has unfortunately also accelerated racist sentiments against Asian Australians and international students from Asia. In February, a student who had returned from visiting family in Malaysia found she had been evicted from her rental, as her landlord assumed she had travelled to China for Chinese New Year.




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The protracted uncertainty of not knowing if students can pursue or complete their studies or continue to pay their rent can significantly affect their mental health.

A recent report found due to culture, language and academic barriers international students are at a higher risk of mental ill-health than domestic students.

In 2019, the Victorian Coroners Prevention Unit found 27 international students died by suicide between 2009 and 2015 in the state. But the coroner said this was likely to be an underestimation.

After the Victorian Coroner’s finding, the state government appointed Orygen Youth Health to undertake research to formulate a model of care that looks at mental health support and services for international students.

What can Australia do?

Australia can lead the way by developing a model of care that is responsive to the needs of affected COVID-19 international students. It should be informed by policies and programs that prevent international students feeling a worsening sense of entrapment, or being boxed-in by their circumstances.

The Australian government must work closely with both international students and universities to formulate practical support designed to mitigate the drivers of mental distress. Support and assistance can be informed by our national mental health policy settings, and aim to ensure the widest possible range of proven interventions that promote well-being, and reduce mental distress and vulnerability




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Financial support to ease pressure must be paralleled with culturally competent and easily accessible mental-health support. How Australia, as a society, responds and supports international students during the pandemic and its aftermath will be a defining moment for Australian international education.

In view of strengthening Australia as a trusted and reputable international education destination for current and future international students, COVID-19 provides us an opportunity to live out our depth of empathy, as an egalitarian and cosmopolitan society.The Conversation

Hannah Soong, Senior Lecturer and Socio-cultural researcher, UniSA Education Futures, University of South Australia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

90,000 foreign graduates are stuck in Australia without financial support: it’s a humanitarian and economic crisis in the making



Shutterstock

Ly Tran, Deakin University and George Tan, University of Adelaide

COVID-19 has left governments scrambling for balanced economic, social and ethical policy responses.

The Australian government’s A$130 billion JobKeeper payment – a wage subsidy to keep Australians in work – is vital for our response to the pandemic and future economic recovery.

But temporary visa holders, including international temporary graduates, have fallen through the cracks. The temporary graduate visa (subclass 485) is for international graduates of a qualification from an Australian institution. It allows them to stay in Australia for two to four years to gain work experience.




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There are nearly 90,000 temporary graduate visa holders in Australia.

International graduates on temporary visas rely solely on wage income to cover their living expenses. These visa holders mainly work in industries that have suffered majored losses, such as hospitality, and they are not entitled to the JobKeeker payment.

The Tasmanian government has just announced a $3 million support package for temporary visa holders which would include 485 visa holders.

This is a first from any state or territory government and will hopefully spur similar support from universities and other jurisdictions – including from the federal government.

It’s time for Australia to be reciprocal and take care of international graduates, who are major contributors to our economy and society, in their time of need. It’s both a humanitarian issue and a sensible economic strategy.

A major drawcard for Australia

International education is Australia’s third largest export – behind iron ore and coal – and its largest services export. It contributes almost $40 billion to the Australian economy and creates around 250,000 full time jobs.

The 485 visa was introduced in 2008 and updated in 2013, taking on recommendations from the 2011 Knight Review, which recognised post-study work rights for international students as crucial for Australia to remain competitive in the education export market.

Since then, the temporary graduate visa has become a drawcard for international students. In our 2017-19 study, 76% international students indicated access to this visa was an important factor when choosing Australia as their study destination.




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The top five citizenship countries of 485 visa holders in Australia have mirrored the top five source countries of international enrolments in Masters by coursework programs since 2013.

Many temporary graduate visa holders become skilled migrants or international students again. Of the of 30,952 visa holders who transitioned to other visas in the 2018-19 financial year, 45.3% became skilled migrants and 34.9% became international students again.

While international temporary graduates contribute to Australian tax revenues, they are not entitled to subsidised government services. This means they bring net income to the Australian economy.

Our temporary graduate visa survey and interviews show international graduates often desperately need work experience and an income to cover their living costs in Australia.

They do not want to compromise their career goals or permanent residency outcomes.

For this reason, they may be exploited and willing to accept jobs outside their field and in industries most vulnerable to job losses during a crisis.



Census data shows cleaning, sales and hospitality are among the top five jobs for international temporary graduates. And many are front-line workers serving the Australian community, especially in aged care, health care, supermarkets and the cleaning sector.

Other countries support them

Australia’s key competing destinations for international education are giving their international students, international graduates and other temporary workers access to their welfare schemes.

New Zealand is not restricting international students and graduates from accessing its wage subsidy scheme. Britain and Canada allow international students and graduates access to the Coronavirus Job Retention Subsidy and the Canada Emergency Response Benefit, respectively.

Australia’s current policy jeopardises not only these international graduates’ security but also its competitiveness as a destination for international students.

On April 3, Prime Minister Scott Morrison sent out a chilling message that international students and other temporary visa holders can return to their home countries if they were unable to support themselves.

Apart from the fact international graduates can’t return to their home countries due to border closures, many have signed rental contracts in Australia.

Others may be doing further studies.

Temporary graduates are no longer international students. As a result, they do not qualify for their former university’s hardship support funds, loans and food banks or any other resources for international students.

The international education sector and universities, which rely on the 485 visa to attract international students, have a duty of care to these visa recipients.

Universities are projected to incur significant losses for the next three years due to its loss of international students.




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There are many factors that will determine how well Australia’s international education industry recovers. These include the recovery of other major provider countries of international education such as China and India who continue to grapple with this pandemic.

But when the appetite for international education returns, Australia’s efforts to manage its international students and alumni in this period could reinstate its reputation and help its economic recovery.The Conversation

Ly Tran, Professor and ARC Future Fellow, Deakin University and George Tan, Adjunct Fellow, University of Adelaide

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Why closing our borders to foreign workers could see fruit and vegetable prices spike



Dave Hunt/AAP

Michael Rose, Australian National University

One aspect of the COVID-19 crisis that has so far escaped widespread public attention in Australia is its potential impact on our food security.

We haven’t seen supermarket shortages of fruit and vegetables like toilet paper and pasta because, being perishable, they are not easily stockpiled and therefore less prone to demand-side spikes.




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But being perishable also makes them more susceptible to supply-side shocks, such as we’re seeing with higher prices now for the likes of broccoli due to the impact of drought and bushfires.

The major variable in whether the coronavirus crisis will hurt fruit, vegetable and nut supplies (and prices) depends on how they are picked while the nation’s border remains closed to the foreign seasonal workers on which Australian farmers depend.

Foreign muscles, Australian fruit

Rural Australia’s dependence on the muscles of tens of thousands of backpackers and workers on temporary working visas is sometime minimised by official statistics.

More than one-third of peak seasonal jobs on horticultural farms are filled by overseas workers, according to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences.

But anyone in direct contact with the industry knows most direct harvest labour in Australia is done by foreigners.

Official statistics about agricultural workers are rubbery. The Australian Bureau of Statistics, for example, can only estimate the total number of workers at between 240,000 and 408,000.

The vagueness is due to three reason. First, the data is based on a single month (in this case August 2016) and picking work is seasonal, with less workers employed in winter. Second, workers move around, so double-counting can occur. Third, overseas workers and contract workers provided by labour hire companies are not included in labour force surveys.

What immigration data tells us, however, is that in 2017-18 about 31,000 backpackers did at least 88 days of farm work to be eligible to extend their visas for a year. (There are no numbers for the number of backpackers working on farms for other reasons.)

A further 8,500 workers from Pacific Island nations and Timor-Leste worked on farms for up to six months on visas issued under Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme. This increased to about 12,000 in 2018-19.

Domestic restrictions

The indefinite closure of Australia’s borders to non-resident foreign nationals jeopardises this supply of farm workers.

The question is whether the spike in domestic unemployment will see Australian workers (and other foreign workers) displaced from other sectors flocking to rural areas to take up those jobs.

Possible complications are travel restrictions, with states closing borders and city dwellers being told to stay away from Australia’s country towns, and the Australian government’s income assistance measures.

As migration researcher Henry Sherrell notes of the job seeker allowance being doubled to A$550 a week, “that’s a pretty decent week if you’re on picking piece rates”.




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“In theory, Australians laid off in the many sectors now facing recession could head for the countryside and start picking fruit,” he argues in an article co-authored with Stephen Howes, an economics professor at the ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

In practice, it is just not going to happen. The work is difficult, and farms often geographically isolated. It would take years not months to change the reality that farm work is just not in the choice set of most Australians – who, after all, live in one of the most urbanised and richest countries in the world.

An exemption for seasonal workers

Allowing backpackers and seasonal workers in Australia to extend their visas is an obvious first step. On top of any measures to encourage foreign workers to stay, the longer term may require making an exception to the ban on their entering the country.

The entry of seasonal workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste already requires medical checks before they travel. Exempting those with seasonal work visas from our closed border policy would not be unreasonable. Canada, which runs a similar guest worker program, has already done so.



With Australian help, workers could be tested for COVID-19 before they fly. On arrival here they would be quarantined for 14 days like everyone else.

The government would need to step in and pay for suitable accommodation, catering and medical services. It would also need to ensure arrangements so workers can get home. But there are there a number of benefits to justify the cost.




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It contributes not only to Australia’s food security but also its national interest, maintaining and deepening its bonds with its island neighbours.

If there is a silver lining to the current grim situation, it may be that it could serve to make real the rhetoric that our relationship with the Pacific (and Timor-Leste) is one defined by partnership, in which we help ourselves through helping each other.The Conversation

Michael Rose, Research fellow, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

With the US and Iran on the brink of war, the dangers of Trump’s policy of going it alone become clear


Klaus W. Larres, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

President Donald Trump’s policy toward Iran is in deep crisis. The president’s approach has the support neither of America’s allies nor of its strategic rivals, China and Russia. And his policy – made even more confrontational by the shooting of a high-ranking Iranian official – has boxed him into a situation where, short of dramatic reversal, Washington and Tehran are edging close to war.

By failing to forge policies in cooperation with allies, the U.S. was robbed of advice and expertise in how to tackle the problems posed by Iran. Above all, it led to the dangerous deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Iran after the U.S. became the sole country to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. That deal was painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration in cooperation with five other world powers.

Instead of Trump’s harsh policy imposing maximum pressure on Iran, Iran has turned the tables and has put pressure on a freshly impeached U.S. president whose reelection is by no means assured and whose international diplomatic isolation and weakness is no secret in the region.

And once again, Trump took unilateral action early on Friday morning. The killings of Iran’s revered and powerful military commander, General Qassem Soleimani, and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a U.S. drone strike on Baghdad airport has further escalated tension in the region.

The killings immediately caused huge anti-American protests in Iran and led to the rise of global oil prices and the fall of stock markets around the world.

Iran has vowed “harsh revenge” for the assassination of Soleimani, the strategic mastermind behind Tehran’s entire ambitious Middle East policy. He also coordinated Iran’s widespread covert operations program and provided much of the strategic expertise for President Bashar Assad’s war in Syria.

President Trump holding the memorandum announcing the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, May 8, 2018, in Washington.
AP/Evan Vucci

Wishful thinking?

Since coming to office in January 2017, President Trump’s approach to resolve America’s longstanding quarrel with Iran has consisted of two stages.

The politics of maximum pressure – imposing stiff economic sanctions – combined with harsh rhetoric toward Tehran’s leaders was to be followed by a second stage of intense personal diplomacy that would culminate in the signing of a great new deal of cooperation with longtime enemy Iran.

It would turn Trump into one of America’s greatest foreign policy presidents and might even, or so he hoped, earn him a Nobel Peace Prize.

As an international relations scholar and former diplomatic and foreign policy adviser at the German embassy in Beijing, I believe this approach consisted of a lot of wishful thinking.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei simply refused to engage with Washington on the conditions laid down by Trump. Those conditions included Iran halting all uranium enrichment and ceasing support for the region’s militant groups.

Tables turned

Trump’s unorthodox idea – conducting the nation’s diplomacy singlehandedly and without asking for much advice from experts in the State Department or from his allies – has been revealed as untenable.

Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 multi-party nuclear deal with Iran was caused by his unhappiness that the deal was not meant to restrain Iran’s aggressive politics in the region. Trump also believed it would not effectively prevent Tehran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons in the long run.

But his policy toward Iran appears not to have contained and intimidated the country’s leaders. It has instead emboldened the country to aggressively challenge U.S. policies in the Middle East.

U.S. withdrawal from the deal was deeply resented by both Iran and the international community. And it started the rapid deterioration of relations with Tehran.

The recent siege of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad by violent protesters who were clearly directed by the Tehran regime recalled the Iranian hostage crisis 40 years ago that decisively contributed to President Jimmy Carter’s electoral defeat.

The shooting down of an expensive American drone by Iran in June as well as Tehran’s open support of the Assad regime in Syria and the Hezbollah terrorist organization in Lebanon were further indications of Iran’s challenge to the U.S.

It appears that Trump’s airstrike on the Baghdad airport was an attempt to demonstrate America’s power and to break out of a largely self-inflicted foreign policy failure.

New tack

I believe that President Trump’s diplomacy toward Iran requires urgent course corrections.

The only option left – and one not yet seriously considered by the Trump administration – is to fall back on cooperation with other great powers, not least with Washington’s many allies, such as the U.K., France and Germany, who are still anxious for American global leadership. The Trump administration has little option but to return to the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran, though perhaps it could be somewhat modified to enable Trump to save face.

The administration could then embark on a unified Western policy to restrain both Iranian leadership ambitions in the Middle East and Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

The killing of Soleimani and the angry reaction to his death, however, has made this almost impossible in the short run. But tempers may cool.

Despite recent joint Russian-Chinese-Iranian naval maneuvers, Moscow and Beijing are also still interested in containing Iranian ambitions. Iranian dominance in the Middle East and the resulting further tension and escalating rivalry with Saudi Arabia for regional control would hardly benefit the great powers and the stability of the region.

Whether or not the Trump administration is capable of and willing to embark on such a major change of course is unclear. But I believe it is the only way out of a crisis largely caused by Trump’s unilateral policies.

[ Insight, in your inbox each day. You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter. ]The Conversation

Klaus W. Larres, Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor; Adjunct Professor of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Agents of foreign influence: with China it’s a blurry line between corporate and state interests


File 20190226 26162 bsb4uy.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1
Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act obliges individuals to register if they act on behalf of “foreign principals”.
Shutterstock

John Garrick, Charles Darwin University

Former federal trade minister Andrew Robb says he has quit his A$880,000-a-year consultancy job with Chinese-owned Landbridge Group because it didn’t have anything for him do.

Former Victorian premier John Brumby says he has quit as a director of Chinese tech giant Huawei in Australia because he has too much else to do.

Former federal foreign minister and ex-NSW premier Bob Carr has quit his job as director of the Australia-China Relations Institute, an organisation bankrolled by a Chinese billionaire with a history of using donations to cosy up to politicians.

It might be just a coincidence that these decisions have come just days before new foreign influence transparency laws come into effect on March 1.

The new laws are supposed to make visible the “nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia’s government and political process”. There is more than enough evidence that greater transparency is needed. But the extent to which the new rules will achieve this is questionable.

Money talks

Federal parliament passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITS) in December. The Act obliges individuals to register if they act on behalf of “foreign principals” – be they governments, government-related entities, political organisations or government-related individuals.

Failing to apply for (or renew) registration, providing false and misleading information or destroying records may lead to a prison term of up to six years for individuals and fines of A$88,200 for companies.

Registrable activities include:

  • parliamentary and political lobbying on behalf of a foreign principal
  • communications activities for the purpose of political or government influence
  • employment or activities of former cabinet ministers.

An example of the latter is Andrew Robb.

In February 2016 Robb resigned as federal trade minister and announced he would not recontest his seat. He left parliament in July. Three months later he had his new job, getting paid way more than the prime minister as a consultant to the Landbridge Group.




Read more:
View from The Hill: Would Landbridge be on or off the government’s register of foreign interests?


It is always instructive to note the first jobs taken by politicians after they leave parliament. Those appointments generally reflect relationships already well-groomed.

Landbridge is a privately owned Chinese company, but like many Chinese companies has strong ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Its substantial interests in petrochemicals and ports includes a 99-year lease over the Darwin port, which is considered of strategic importance in China’s diplomatic dance with the United States.

Qualitative differences

China isn’t the only foreign power interested in having influence in Australia, of course. Historical ties have meant that Britain once dictated Australia’s foreign policy. Since World War II the United States has had almost as much power.

Now China, Australia’s largest trading partner, taking about 30% of our exports, looms large. But the power exercised by the Chinese regime is qualitatively different.

For all its economic liberalisation since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China remains a one party state, with repression worsening under Xi Jinping. On freedom of the the press, for example, China ranks 176 out of 180 countries.

Commercial, military and political influences are wrapped up together. Lines between state and private enterprises are blurred. When Chinese business interests curry favour with foreign politicians and officials, there’s a high chance that statecraft is also being advanced. “Soft power” is used extensively.

Agent of influence

This is what made the tawdry scandal involving former NSW senator Sam Dastyari so alarming.

Though a humble senator, Dastyari was a key Labor Party fundraiser and powerbroker. He later admitted that vanity and arrogance made him susceptible to the charm offensive of Huang Xiangmo – the billionaire who courted Bob Carr to head up the Australia-China Relations Institute.

Dastyari accepted financial gifts from Huang’s company, including a A$44,000 payment to settle a legal dispute, along with payments from other donors connected to the Chinese Communist Party.




Read more:
The foreign donations bill will soon be law – what will it do, and why is it needed?


Such payments made it obvious why he defied his own party’s policy and defended China’s militant stance in the South China Sea. He was subsequently labelled a Chinese “agent of influence”.

These revelations resulted in Dastyari resigning from parliament in 2017. Earlier this month it was revealed the federal government had rejected Huang’s bid to become an Australian citizen and stripped him of his permanent residency visa.




Read more:
Why do we keep turning a blind eye to Chinese political interference?


On the basis of these examples highlighted above, there’s a strong case for making influence peddling open and transparent.

Whether the new laws can achieve that is another matter. They may curtail flagrant scenarios where those leaving public office sell their wares to the highest bidder. But to work effectively, the laws and their enforcers will need to constantly adapt and evolve as agents look for creative ways to wield influence from the shadows.The Conversation

John Garrick, Senior Lecturer, Business Law, Charles Darwin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Australia should brace for a volatile year in foreign policy in 2019


Susan Harris Rimmer, Griffith University

By the end of 2019 we should be able to assess how Australia is travelling with the grand plan laid out in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. In this, an election year, I examine the status of our most important international relationships.

My verdict: decidedly shaky.

A difficult 2018

Even before the August leadership spill, 2018 was a difficult year for Australia’s foreign policy.

New prime minister Scott Morrison visited Jakarta within days of his appointment, but did not attend the Pacific Island Forum on Nauru. He also cancelled long-planned visits to Malaysia and Vietnam. He then jeopardised the Indonesian relationship with a rushed announcement about moving Australia’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Australia was increasingly criticised in various multilateral fora for its detention practices on Nauru and Manus Island, as well as its climate policies and defence of the coal industry. Morrison then had a shaky summit season.




Read more:
With Bishop gone, Morrison and Payne face significant challenges on foreign policy


Relationship with China, Middle East

China put us in the “deep freeze” for most of the year, putting off visits between ministers, deferring a trip by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade secretary, and delaying a range of educational exchanges.

The Chinese embassy issued a safety warning to international students, a large market for international education. This was in response to then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s vow to crack down on foreign interference in Australian affairs, as well as our position on the South China Sea.

In August, the federal government banned Chinese-owned tech giant Huawei from taking part in the roll-out of 5G mobile infrastructure over national security concerns.

This was the one relationship that may have benefited in the short term from the change in prime minister.

Despite these set-backs, the need to be principled and steady, and to build a long-term relationship with China, remains a challenge.

The year ended badly. With the West Jerusalem embassy announcement in December, Morrison proved a new diplomatic adage: that you can, in fact, please no one, all of the time.




Read more:
Morrison’s decision to recognise West Jerusalem the latest bad move in a mess of his own making


In the Pacific

Some issues are slow-burn. Most Australians still do not realise the deep implications for domestic policy raised by the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal that came into effect on December 30, 2018. These implications range from changes to labour market testing, intellectual property issues and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions that allow private corporations to bypass national courts and seek compensation from extraterritorial tribunals if they believe a change in the law or policy has harmed their investments.

But one bright spot was the so-called Pacific pivot, which Morrison announced in November, and now has to be realised.

While the white paper laid out a stepping up in engagement, long overdue, with the Pacific, it was China’s increasing influence in the region that led to a sense of urgency and scale to the Pacific pivot announcement.

The announcement includes A$2 billion of new funding for infrastructure, a billion dollars to entice Australian businesses back into the region, adding five new diplomatic missions, enhancing labour mobility opportunities and creating an “office of the Pacific” with whole-of-government oversight. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US promised to connect electricity to 70% of PNG’s population by 2030.

These goals must be realised in a spirit of true partnership. Australian researcher Tess Newton Cain points out that Australia often misses the right tone of respect and partnership in its announcements to the region. And without climate leadership, will the Pacific trust us?

Leadership churn

No white paper can protect Australia from the damage to our international reputation over our constant turn-over of prime ministers. Based on current polls, another one is likely in May after a federal election.

The Lowy Institute’s Michael Fullilove says that worse than being a laughing stock, now Australia can be ignored while the region moves on.

The image of German Chancellor Angela Merkel barely concealing her boredom at meeting her fifth Australian leader in five years at the G20 Summit spoke volumes.

Opposition leader Bill Shorten is not known for his foreign policy vision, but Penny Wong is a respected foreign policy thinker, and an interesting symbol for the region on diversity, multiculturalism and the rule of law.

Will she take the foreign minister role in cabinet if the ALP is elected, assuming she may have some choice? For Australia’s sake, she should; we desperate need steady interlocutors. Richard Marles is also a respected figure in the Pacific.

A Shorten government should also display bipartisanship and give Marise Payne and Julie Bishop roles as special envoys or ambassadors to shore up some degree of continuity. Former PMs Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard and Malcolm Turnbull could all be given roles to play.

Big meetings ahead

Thailand will host ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2019. The 10-member association has been criticised for allowing Thailand’s military government to become chair.

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) will be hosted by Chile in 2019, showing the reach of APEC across the Pacific. APEC was not able to produce a leaders’ declaration at the PNG summit and it was the scene of extraordinary tension this year. Chile will be hoping for a return to business as usual.

Japan will also host an early G20 Summit in Osaka in June, part of an enormous diplomatic year for them. In 2019, Japan is hosting the Rugby World Cup and preparing for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020. Then in April, Emperor Akihito, will abdicate, making way for his successor Crown Prince Naruhito.

Threats on horizon

The Council for Foreign Relations, an independent US think-tank, nominated its highest risks for 2019, which I have modified for Australia:

  • A highly disruptive cyber-attack on critical infrastructure and networks

  • Renewed tensions on the Korean peninsula following a collapse of denuclearisation negotiations

  • Armed conflict between Iran and the US or one of its allies

  • Armed conflict over disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea between China and one or more Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam)

  • A mass casualty terrorist attack by either foreign or home-grown terrorist(s)

  • Continued violent re-imposition of government control in Syria

  • Deepening economic crisis and political instability in Venezuela leading to violent civil unrest and more refugees leaving

  • Worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, exacerbated by ongoing foreign intervention in the civil war

  • Increased violence and instability in Afghanistan resulting from the Taliban insurgency and potential government collapse.

International elections

The Indian general election is expected in April or May 2019, a test for Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Other major elections in 2019 are due in Afghanistan, Canada, South Africa, Indonesia, Thailand and The Philippines.

Key partnerships

Alas, the UK remains focused on Brexit.

And all international diplomats are bracing themselves for the next phase of Trump’s foreign policy.

The US foreign policy think-tanks argue that with the Democrats in control of the House of Representatives, the Trump White House will be more active in foreign policy as it struggles to pursue a productive domestic agenda. This could lead Australia into some kind of rollercoaster if we are not willing to disengage from some US requests for our assistance.

In 2019, the US Ambassador to Australia will finally arrive after more than two years’ delay. Republican Washington lawyer Arthur Culvahouse might well spice things up during his posting.

He told the US senate that while China is Australia’s largest trading partner, Australia has also given China “a nation that’s already … aggressive” an “outsized” influence and opportunity to press its agenda.

Depending on the election outcomes, India is looking more like a natural ally for Australia, at least in the shared interest in strengthening ASEAN and the EAS process, and the early conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in which both countries are partners.

The way forward for Australia is clearer too, if the government adopts the approach laid out in Peter Varghese’s report An India Economic Strategy to 2035. The former diplomat and public servant envisages the goal by 2035 to be to:

… lift India into its top three export markets, to make it the third largest destination in Asia for Australian outward investment, and to bring it into the inner circle of Australia’s strategic partnerships and with people to people ties as close as any in Asia.

Strategy requires skill and leadership. We will need all three in 2019. We have a volatile year ahead.The Conversation

Susan Harris Rimmer, Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Griffith Law School, Griffith University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.