Christian Porter quits cabinet, refusing to find out who gave him money for legal costs


AAP/Lukas Coch

Michelle Grattan, University of CanberraIndustry Minister Christian Porter has been forced to resign from cabinet after declining to seek and provide to Scott Morrison the names of the anonymous benefactors who have helped fund his legal costs.

Morrison has appointed energy minister Angus Taylor acting industry minister and sources say he is likely to continue in the dual role.

Porter’s resignation comes as Newspoll shows the government slightly reducing Labor’s two-party lead, from 54-46% to 53-47%. Labor’s primary vote fell 2 points to 38%; the Coalition rose a point to 37%.

Both leaders took hits in approval: Morrison is on a net negative of minus 4, while Anthony Albanese is on a net negative of minus 11. Morrison’s lead as better PM has fallen to 47-35%, from 50-34% three weeks ago – this is the closest since March last year.

In a three-page statement, Porter renewed his attack on the ABC and said a statement provided by the now-deceased woman who accused him of historical rape – which he denies – showed the allegation lacked credibility and was written by someone “very unwell”.

Porter is keeping the funds donated to a “blind trust”, the amount of which is unknown. He also says he will seek to run again in his Western Australian seat of Pearce, which is on a 5.2% margin.

Last week, Porter updated his parliamentary register of interests to reveal a “part contribution” to his legal bills for his (now settled) defamation case against the ABC from “a blind trust known as the Legal Services Trust”. Porter said he did not know the names of donors.

Morrison asked his department to advise whether the arrangement breached ministerial standards.

But Morrison indicated at a news conference on Sunday he and Porter had finalised his future ahead of the advice.

Morrison was clearly anxious to have it settled before his trip to the United States, so it would not be a distraction during what he hopes will be a time of positive news following last week’s announcement of the AUKUS security agreement.

Bad publicity around Porter has been a running sore for the government for much of the year.

The historical rape allegation surfaced publicly in February, when the ABC reported material about it had been sent to several politicians, including the prime minister. Porter was not named but later identified himself, declaring the alleged assault had never happened.

Initially, he hoped to retain his position as attorney-general, but this was politically untenable and he was moved to the industry job in a reshuffle.

With an outcry over the “blind trust” and an election approaching next year, Morrison could not afford another prolonged scandal around Porter. He indicated Porter’s future was in doubt when he said last week he was taking the matter very seriously.

Morrison said on Sunday that in their discussions, Porter had been unable to “practically provide further information because of the nature of those [trust] arrangements”.

That Porter couldn’t provide the information meant he could not conclusively rule out a perceived conflict of interest.

Morrison said Porter was upholding the ministerial standards by resigning.

Porter said in his statement that while he had no right of access to the trust’s funding or conduct, he had asked the trustee for an assurance, which he received, “that none of the contributors were lobbyists or prohibited foreign entities.

“This additional information was provided as part of my Ministerial disclosure,” he said.

He said no doubt the desire of some or many of the donors to remain anonymous was driven by wanting to avoid “trial by mob”.

Porter said he believed that he had provided the information required under the Members’ Register of Interests, and that the additional disclosures he provided under the Ministerial Standards were in accord with its additional requirements.

“However, after discussing the matter with the Prime Minister I accept that any uncertainty on this point provides a very unhelpful distraction for the Government in its work.”

He said to the extent the uncertainty might be resolved by seeking further information about donors’ identities, “this would require me to put pressure on the Trust to provide me with information to which I am not entitled.

“I am not prepared to seek to break the confidentiality of those people who contributed to my legal fees under what are well-known and regular legal structures, including the confidentiality attached to the Trust contribution,” Porter said.

He had explained he “could not assist any process that would ultimately allow people who have done nothing wrong to become targets of the social media mob.”

“Ultimately, I decided that if I have to make a choice between seeking to pressure the Trust to break individuals’ confidentiality in order to remain in Cabinet, or alternatively forego my Cabinet position, there is only one choice I could, in all conscience, make.”

In his renewed attack on the ABC, Porter said that “seemingly with great care and effort – [it] has reported only those parts of the information that it has in its possession which feeds into its narrative of guilt.

“I have recently been provided from a source outside the ABC with a copy of the only signed document that the person who made and subsequently withdrew the complaint ever made.

“Many parts of that 88-page document are such that any reasonable person would conclude that they show an allegation that lacks credibility; was based on repressed memory (which has been completely rejected by courts as unreliable and dangerous); which relied on diaries said to be drafted in 1990/91 but which were actually words composed in 2019; and, was written by someone who was, sadly, very unwell.”

Albanese said Porter needed to answer where the money had come from. He also said Morrison had not sacked Porter – Porter had resigned.The Conversation

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Why governments will have to consider the costs of long COVID when easing pandemic restrictions


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Richard Meade, Auckland University of TechnologyWith governments worldwide under pressure to ease pandemic restrictions as vaccination rates rise and impatience with border restrictions grows, new threats become clearer.

One of the costliest, it is now feared, could be a tsunami of “long COVID” cases.

Long COVID is a serious ongoing illness that follows an acute episode of the disease. It is characterised by extreme fatigue, muscle weakness, post-exertional malaise and an inability to concentrate (“brain fog”), among many other symptoms.

The focus, therefore, needs to shift towards protecting quality of life as much as saving lives in the first place.

In the UK it is reported two million people have experienced long COVID. Around 385,000 having suffered symptoms for a year or more.

The nation’s so-called “Freedom Day” on July 19 went ahead despite expert warnings of soaring infections, especially among younger and unvaccinated people. A further 500,000 long COVID cases have been predicted during the current wave of infection.

These numbers far outstrip the already staggering 150,000 deaths attributed to the virus in the UK — and the associated costs will be significant.

Putting a price on long COVID

The social costs of long COVID should not be underestimated. For example, suppose an elderly person contracts COVID-19 and dies, when they might otherwise have lived in full health another five years. A health economist would say their early death has cost society five “quality-adjusted life years” (QALYs).

This is usually expressed as a monetary amount that can then be weighed against the cost of saving that person’s life when deciding on appropriate pandemic protections.

Contrast this with a young person contracting COVID-19 and not dying, but suffering long COVID for 10 years, with their estimated quality of life effectively halved while unwell.




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They too will have lost an estimated five QALYs — the same social cost as the elderly person who died.

This means if we ease pandemic restrictions on the basis that people are no longer dying, we might be facing equally serious social costs from long COVID.

If long COVID is chronic and much more common than death from COVID (as the current data strongly suggest), the costs rise further. If sufferers of long COVID also face shortened lives, having endured years of debilitation and misery, the costs rise again.

Rough first estimates suggest the overall economic cost of long COVID could be almost half the cost of COVID-related deaths in the UK.

For younger people, however, the social costs of long COVID are estimated to far outstrip those of dying, meaning they will carry a disproportionate burden of the pandemic’s long-term costs.

Comparison with chronic fatigue syndrome

Long COVID is often likened to chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), which is sometimes called ME (for myalgic encephalomyelitis). Both are characterised as a form of “post-viral fatigue syndrome”, with CFS leaving sufferers seriously debilitated and unable to maintain normal lives — often for years, even decades.

While we have no long-term data to gauge how chronic or serious long COVID might be, we should be mindful that it could be as long-lived as CFS.

Furthermore, long COVID is also reported to affect multiple organs in measurable ways, including damage to major organs like the heart and lungs.

Consequently, long COVID could shorten lives, if not end them. This distinguishes it from CFS which – frustratingly, for sufferers wanting to be taken seriously – lacks recognised objective markers.




Read more:
The mystery of ‘long COVID’: up to 1 in 3 people who catch the virus suffer for months. Here’s what we know so far


Protecting quality of life

On a personal note, I suffered CFS for 11 years and recovered in 2004. It emerged after a flu-like illness in 1993, which evolved into a constellation of symptoms that defied explanation or treatment.

Recovery required years off work and, with the care and support of family and friends, patient and determined rebuilding of my ability to lead a normal life.

The condition involved huge personal, social and professional costs. I was unable to maintain a normal life, relationships and work commitments. Constant ill health, with no end in sight, was enormously frustrating and miserable.




Read more:
I went from regular TV commentator on COVID to long COVID sufferer in just a few months


It never helped that medical practitioners were either incredulous or believed I was unwell but had no real solutions to offer.

Like CFS, long COVID is a serious condition that cannot be taken lightly. Even if not fatal, it can still seriously affect the sufferer’s quality of life. Hence, policymakers need to consider the social costs of long COVID when deciding when and how to ease pandemic restrictions.

Our pandemic response will need to be as much about protecting quality of life as it has been about saving lives. We need to take serious steps to keep long COVID at bay.The Conversation

Richard Meade, Research Fellow in Economics, and in Social Sciences & Public Policy, Auckland University of Technology

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

$34bn and counting – beware cost overruns in an era of megaprojects


Greg Moran, Grattan Institute

A Grattan Institute report released today finds Australian governments spent A$34 billion, or 21%, more on transport projects completed since 2001 than they first told taxpayers they would. And as we enter the era of megaprojects in Australia, costs continue to blow out.

Transport projects worth A$5 billion or more in today’s money were almost unheard of ten years ago. Today, as the chart below shows, megaprojects make up the bulk of the work under way across the country.


Author provided

These megaprojects include WestConnex in Sydney, West Gate Tunnel in Melbourne and Cross River Rail in Brisbane. And this is to say nothing of some enormous projects being planned, such as Melbourne’s Suburban Rail Loop.

We are also hearing calls to add to this bulging pipeline. In June, the transport and infrastructure ministers of all states and territories said they were “clearing the way for an infrastructure-led recovery” from the COVID-19 recession.




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We may live to regret open-slather construction stimulus


Cost overrun risks rise with project size

The Grattan report, The rise of megaprojects: counting the costs, sounds a warning about the risks of this approach. The report uses the Deloitte Access Economics Investment Monitor to look at the final cost of all public road and rail projects worth A$20 million or more and completed since 2001. As the chart below shows, we found bigger projects overran their initial cost estimates more often and by more.


Author provided

Almost half of the projects with an initial price tag of more than A$1 billion in today’s money had a cost overrun. These projects overran their initial costs by 30% on average. The extra amount spent on some megaprojects was the size of a megaproject itself.

Cost announcements before governments were prepared to commit formally to a project were particularly risky. Only one-third of projects had costs announced prematurely, but these accounted for more than three-quarters of the A$34 billion overrun.




Read more:
Missing evidence base for big calls on infrastructure costs us all


When early costings of infrastructure turn out to be too low, it distorts investment planning in three ways:

  1. underestimating the costs of transport infrastructure can lead to over-investing in it relative to other spending priorities

  2. if governments misunderstand the uncertainty in a project’s cost at the time they commit to it, their decision to invest in that project was made on an incorrect basis

  3. because unrealistic cost estimates are more prevalent for larger projects, governments are more likely to over-invest in larger projects.

There’s also a fourth and no less important problem: when unrealistically low cost estimates are announced, the public is misled.

Despite the experience of the past 20 years, the costs of big projects continue to be underestimated. The chart below shows A$24 billion more than first expected will be spent on just six mega megaprojects (that is, projects with an initial cost estimate of A$5 billion or more) now under construction. Overruns on other megaprojects have been reported too.


Author provided



Read more:
Transport promises for election 2019: the good, the bad and the downright ugly


What needs to be done?

With megaproject costs continuing to blow out, governments should take immediate steps to manage better the portfolio of work under way — particularly if they are looking to add to it in the name of economic stimulus.

Each state’s auditor-general should conduct a stocktake of current projects. This would give the public and the government a clear picture of the situation.

Ministers should begin reporting to parliament on a continuous disclosure basis. Any material changes in expected costs, benefits or completion dates of very large projects should be disclosed.

Steps should be taken to put decisions on the incoming batch of projects on a sounder basis, too. When announcing a cost, ministers and government agencies should disclose how advanced the estimate is. If the proposal is at an early stage, they should quote a range of estimates.

Governments should also require their infrastructure advisory bodies to at least assess — if not approve — large proposals before funding is committed.

Looking further ahead, action is needed to stop the pattern of spending billions more than expected on megaprojects. State departments of transport and infrastructure should devote more resources to identifying modest-sized transport infrastructure proposals.




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The PM wants to fast-track mega-projects for pandemic recovery. Here’s why that’s a bad idea


And governments need to start learning from the past. Detailed project data, particularly on expected and actual costs, should be centrally collated in each state.

Post-completion reviews should be mandatory on all large projects. These reviews should be published.

If there is no change in the way infrastructure is conceived and delivered in Australia, then the era of the megaproject will indeed mean megaproblems.The Conversation

Greg Moran, Senior Associate, Grattan Institute

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Mould and damp health costs are about 3 times those of sugary drinks. We need a healthy housing agenda



Burdun Iliya/Shutterstock

Rebecca Bentley, University of Melbourne and Emma Baker

The World Health Organisation has always been interested in housing as one of the big “causes of the causes”, of the social determinants, of health. The WHO launched evidence-based guidelines for healthy housing policies in 2019.

Australia is behind the eight ball on healthy housing. Other governments, including in the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand, acknowledge housing as an important contributor to the burden of disease. These countries have major policy initiatives focused on this agenda.

In Australia, however, we do housing and we do health, but they sit in different portfolios of government and aren’t together in the (policy) room often enough. Housing should be embedded in our National Preventive Health Strategy.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced us to rethink how we approach health and protect our populations. It has amplified social and economic vulnerability. The pandemic has almost certainly brought housing and health together in our minds.

Housing – its ability to provide shelter, its quality, location, warmth – has proven to be a key factor in the pandemic’s “syndemic” nature. That is, as well as shaping exposure to the virus itself, housing contributes to the social patterning of chronic diseases that increase COVID-19 risks.

Graphic showing interactions of COVID-19 with social determinants of health and non-communicable diseases
Interactions of COVID-19, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and the social determinants of health.
Bambra et al, The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities (2020), Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health



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Overcrowding and affordability stress: Melbourne’s COVID-19 hotspots are also housing crisis hotspots


Housing and health are intertwined

Housing affects health in many ways. At the broad scale, housing disadvantage, unaffordable housing and housing of poor quality have been the focus of much recent Australian research. More specific housing drivers of health, such as household mould, injury, overcrowding, noise, cold and damp, have received renewed global attention.

However, capturing the combined health effect of housing is difficult. It’s hard to measure and has many components, and everyone has slightly different housing (and health).

But epidemiologists can provide us with a useful way of estimating the “burden” of various risk factors for population health. Housing risk factors have rarely been examined in Australia, but our estimates flag that the increasing health burden of housing demands attention.

For example, we estimate the health cost (measured in disability-adjusted life years) due to respiratory and cardiovascular disease that can be attributed to mouldy or damp housing is about three times the cost attributable to sugary drinks in Australia. Damp, cold and mouldy housing generates a substantial health burden and could be an easy target for public health prevention strategies. These housing conditions stand alongside many of the classic risk factors such as diet, smoking and obesity.

This estimate of health burden does not even factor in the important role housing plays in mental health. Housing affordability, security, suitability, location and condition are all associated with good mental health.

With rates of eviction likely to increase once moratoriums are lifted across the country, the housing-related mental health burden will almost certainly increase too.

We have previously estimated more than 2.5 million Australians are living in unhealthy housing — and that this number is rising.

The Australian Index of Unhealthy Housing – a composite measure of housing affordability, security, quality, location and accessibility – shows increases in unhealthy housing from 2000 to 2016.
Adapted from Baker et al (2019), An Australian geography of unhealthy housing



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What housing actions will improve health?

Simple housing-focused interventions could reduce the sizeable health burden from housing-related problems. As the WHO advocates, this requires policy and research that have an eye on both health and housing.

In practical terms, a preventive health strategy would include:

  • minimum rental housing standards to protect occupants’ health, which would target structural factors related to damp and mould, ventilation, heating and cooling, injury hazards, maintenance and repair

  • good-quality public housing that is easy to access as a foundation for healthy lives

  • help with fixing problems, such as mould removal and servicing of heaters, for people in poor-quality housing

  • insulation to maintain indoor temperature and increase energy efficiency.

Sick woman sitting on couch with a blanket over her
Poorly insulated housing is a serious health issue in Australia.
fizkes/Shutterstock



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Chilly house? Mouldy rooms? Here’s how to improve low-income renters’ access to decent housing


COVID adds urgency to rethinking our approach

COVID has caused us to rapidly rethink public housing, nursing homes, share houses and small inner-city apartments. When choosing our current housing, few of us would have factored in the potential for isolation and loneliness, the need for separate working and study spaces, access to private green space, or the infection risk of shared lifts.

The experience of many Australians during the pandemic has almost certainly changed our view of the housing that we need, and what we consider to be healthy. It is time to harness this knowledge and learn from our COVID-19 experience.




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How might COVID-19 change what Australians want from their homes?


Many have lamented the missed opportunity to create economic stimulus in our nation’s COVID recovery plan by building more social housing. But social housing is only a small part of the story. Australia needs to embrace a future where good population health goes hand in hand with good-quality, affordable and secure housing – where health is at the forefront of housing policy and public preventive health strategies harness housing.

7 key questions for a healthy housing agenda

The time is right for Australia to put housing and health in the same room and develop a national healthy housing agenda. Our National Health and Medical Research Council-funded Centre for Research Excellence in Healthy Housing aims to lead and shape this agenda. In doing so, we pose the following questions to our governments, research community and stakeholders:

  1. How can we respond in a nationally co-ordinated way to the emerging challenges that COVID-19 presents to healthy housing?

  2. Who should be included in the conversation and in developing the agenda – and what is the role of the Commonwealth Department of Health?

  3. Where does responsibility for providing healthy housing lie?

  4. What is the “minimum standard” of housing that we want to provide to all Australians?

  5. What are the healthy housing priorities? Warmth? Mould? Tenure security? Affordability?

  6. What groups in our society demand immediate attention? Children? Renters? People with disabilities?

  7. How will an Australian healthy housing agenda fit within a national housing agenda (when one exists)?




Read more:
Coronavirus lays bare 5 big housing system flaws to be fixed


The Conversation


Rebecca Bentley, Professor of Social Epidemiology, Principal Research Fellow in Social Epidemiology and Director of the Centre for Research Excellence in Healthy Housing in Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne and Emma Baker, Professor of Housing Research and Deputy Director of the NHMRC Centre of Excellence for Healthy Housing

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The costs of the shutdown are overestimated — they’re outweighed by its $1 trillion benefi



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Richard Holden, UNSW and Bruce Preston, University of Melbourne

As Australia begins to relax its COVID-19 restrictions there is understandable debate about how quickly that should proceed, and whether lockdowns even made sense in Australia in the first place.

The sceptics arguing for more rapid relaxation of containment measures point to the economic costs of lockdowns and appeal to the cold calculus of cost-benefit analysis to conclude that the lives saved by lockdowns don’t justify the economic costs incurred to do so.

Their numbers don’t stack up.

To be able to weigh the value of a life against the economic costs of forgone output from lost jobs and business closures, requires placing a dollar value on one person’s life. This number is called the value of a statistical life.




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In Australia, the Government generally uses a value of A$4.9 million. The United States uses a value of US$10 million.

What are the benefits of the shutdown? This is the value of lives saved plus any indirect economic or health benefits. Lives saved are those excess lives that would be lost if government relied on a strategy that allowed enough people to get infected to result in so-called herd immunity.

How many extra lives would be lost under this second strategy?

To answer this, we need assumptions about the virus.

The lives lost if we let it rip

The initial reproduction rate of the virus, R0, was thought to be about 2.5. This means that every 2 people infected were likely to infect another 5; producing an average infection rate per person of 2.5.

Herd immunity for COVID-19 is estimated to require roughly 60% of the population be infected before the curve begins to flatten and the peak infections fall.




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This happens when the reproduction rate, R0, falls below one. Because of subsequent new infections, the total number infected over the course of the pandemic is closer to 90%.

Given a population of 25 million people and assuming a fatality rate of 1%, this would produce 225,000 deaths.

An assumption of a 1% fatality rate is low from the perspective of those making decisions at the onset of the pandemic, at a time when crucial and reliable data were missing.

Those lives are valued at $1.1 trillion

Converting those fatalities to dollars using the Australian value of a statistical life of A$4.9 million per life yields a cost of A$1.1 trillion.

In rough terms, that’s the amount we have gained by shutting down the economy, provided deaths do not skyrocket when lockdown measures are relaxed and borders re-open.

It is about three fifths of one year’s gross domestic product, which is about A$1.9 trillion.

What are the costs of the shutdown?

These are the direct economic costs from reduced economic activity plus the indirect social, medical, and economic costs, all measured in terms of national income.

A starting point is to take the lost income that occurs from the recession that has probably already begun.

What will the shutdown cost?

Let’s assume that the downturn results in a 10% drop in gross domestic product over 2020 and 2021 – about $180 billion – consistent with IMF forecasts of a fall in GDP of 6.7% in 2020 and a sharp rebound of 6.1% growth in 2021, and comparable to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s forecasts in the latest Statement on Monetary Policy.

Comparing this cost from shutting down – about $180 billion – to the benefit of $1,103 billion – makes the case for shutdown clear.

But this calculation grossly overestimates the costs of the shutdown.

The recession is a consequence of both the shutdown and the pandemic.

We need to attribute costs to each.

Most of the economic costs of the recession are likely to be due to the pandemic itself rather the shutdown.

Many costs would have been borne anyway

Even before the shutdown, economic activity was in decline.

Both in Australia and internationally air travel, restaurant bookings and a range of other activities had fallen sharply.

They were the result of a “private shutdown” that commenced before the mandated government shutdown.

Even in a country such as Sweden, where a shutdown has not been mandatory, there has been a more than 75% reduction in movement in central Stockholm and a more than 90% reduction in travel to some domestic holiday destinations.




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To be generous, let’s assume the costs attributable to the government-mandated part of the shutdown are half of the total costs, making their cost A$90 billion.

In reality, they are likely to be less, one important study suggests much less.

It is hard to imagine a much bigger private shutdown not taking place had the government decided to simply let the disease rip until its spread was slowed by herd immunity.

Support is not a cost

It is also important to note that the government’s spending of A$214 billion to support the economy during the shutdown is a transfer of resources from one part of society to another rather than a cost.

It creates neither direct costs nor benefits for society as a whole, other than the economic distortions coming from raising the revenue to service the spending.

With long-term government bond rates near 1% (less than inflation), the total cost of distortions is likely to be tiny.

Of course, this discussion simplifies what are incredibly complex social, health and economic questions. There are clearly further costs, from both relaxing restrictions and keeping them in place.

Other costs are not that big

These costs are worthy of serious study and should rightly be part of a comprehensive public policy discussion. But looked at through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis these combined effects are likely to be small relative to the value of preventing mass death.

Among them are the incidence of mental health problems and domestic violence under lockdowns. They are important concerns that should be addressed by targeted and well-designed programs.

Weighing against that is evidence that economic crises are associated with declines in overall mortality rates.




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The calculus of death shows the COVID lock-down is clearly worth the cost


While suicides rise, total mortality, including deaths from heart attacks and workplace and traffic accidents, falls.

In the specific case of this pandemic there is survey evidence based on respondents from 58 countries suggesting that strong government responses to the pandemic have been reducing worry and depression.

Also, we have to acknowledge that recessions and educational disruption have health and economic costs that are unequally spread.

The shutdown disproportionately impacts more-disadvantaged people including short-term casual workers, migrant workers, those with disabilities and the homeless.

The most-disadvantaged suffer, either way

This skewing will also be present in the herd immunity option. As New York City makes clear, a rapid spread of the disease also disproportionately impacts disadvantaged communities. One can only speculate about the disease burden should some of our remote indigenous communities get exposed.

To this we should add further achievements of the shutdown:

  • elimination of mental trauma and grief from losing our loved ones

  • avoiding the costs of possible longer-term implications of the disease, which we still know little about

  • avoiding a collapse in the capacity of the health system to deal with other emergencies through the sheer numbers of COVID-19 infected combined with staff shortages due to illness

Those advocating cost-benefit analysis of this kind have to apply the principle systematically. It is difficult to see how the total of these sorts of considerations on each side of the ledger could compare to the benefit of lives saved. They will be an order of magnitude, if not two, smaller.

$90 billion, versus $1.1 trillion

In the cold calculus of cost-benefit analysis, a highly pessimistic view of the economic costs of Australia’s shutdown comes to around $90 billion.

It is a small price to pay compared to the statistical value of lives the shutdown should save, around A$1.1 trillion.

It produces a simple message. The shutdown wins.




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It’s hard to know when to come out from under the doona. It’ll be soon, but not yet


The question we now face is how quickly to relax restrictions. Here, too, there are costs and benefits, and we need to be mindful of the economic cost of a second-wave outbreak, plus mortality costs of disease spread before effective treatments or vaccine become available.

And in all of this bean counting, we should remember that putting a price tag on human life is sometimes unavoidable – such as when a doctor with access to only one ventilator has to choose between two patients.

But we shouldn’t mistake necessity for desirability. We should seek to avoid needing to make such wrenching choices whenever possible.


Dr Jen Schaefer of the Royal Children’s Hospital Melbourne assisted with the preparation of this piece.The Conversation

Richard Holden, Professor of Economics, UNSW and Bruce Preston, Professor of Economics, University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Should we re-open pubs next week? The benefits seem to exceed the costs



Kuranda pub, Far North Queensland.
Shutterstock

Jonathan Karnon, Flinders University and Ben W. Mol, Monash University

Nothing our leaders can do now will return the economy to where it was before COVID-19. For one thing, international travel is likely to remain closed for a long time.

But there are things they can do, and on Friday the prime minister outlined a roadmap.

Of interest to us is whether it makes sense to reopen bars and restaurants.


Commonwealth government, Friday May 8, 2020

The Australian Government committed A$320 billion over six months to support businesses and workers whose incomes has been hit by the COVID-19 pandemic.

That amounts to $12 billion per week.

Reported job losses suggest around 29% is being paid out to support the accommodation and food services industry.




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COVID lockdowns have human costs as well as benefits. It’s time to consider both


That’s about $3.4 billion per week. Bars and restaurants are likely to account for half of it, $1.7 billion per week.

That can be thought of as one of the costs of keeping bars and restaurants closed.

What about the benefits? What costs do we avoid by keeping bars and restaurants closed?

It helps to illustrate our thinking as a decision tree.


The Conversation/Figures author provided, CC BY-ND

The upper branches of the tree represent the decision about whether or not to lift restrictions.

If restrictions are lifted, there may, or may not, be a new outbreak that requires the reintroduction of restrictions.

While we don’t know the likelihood of a new outbreak, we can test different assumptions.




Read more:
The calculus of death shows the COVID lock-down is clearly worth the cost


Given the very low number of new cases of COVID-19, the assumption we have tested is that there would be a one in ten chance of a new outbreak requiring the reintroduction of restrictions.

We also assume that if there was a new outbreak, there would be a 95% chance it could be controlled by re-imposing restrictions on bars and restaurants and only a 5% chance it could not.

It’s a matter of probabilities

If the outbreak was controlled by reimposing restrictions (the 95% probability) we assume an extra 40 COVID-19 deaths and an extra four weeks of restrictions at a financial cost to the government of $6.8 billion.

If the outbreak was more severe and a broader set of restrictions are required (the 5% case) we assume an additional 200 deaths and extra cost to the government of $17 billion.

(We also assume that 25% of the government spending to support the hospitality industry would remain because a decision to reopen bars and restaurants would not result in the industry returning to it’s pre-COVID-19 state – many people would remain cautious about the risks of contracting COVID-19 or have become conditioned to less frequent socialising.)

When we weigh these costs by their probabilities we get expected costs to the government from reopening of $1.1 billion, compared to costs from keeping bars and restaurants closed for another week of $1.7 billion.

Is the $600 million per week value for money?

It suggests the government would be $600 million per week better off it it reopens bars and restaurants.

We would expect a number of extra COVID-19 deaths. Multiplying the probabilities of the extra deaths under each scenario by the likelihood of each scenario suggests there would be an extra 4.8 deaths if bars and restaurants are reopened this week.

Because the average age of people dying due to COVID-19 is around 80 years, and each might have around ten more years to live, the number of life years per week that would be lost as a result of the $600 million per week the government saved would be 48.




Read more:
New cancer drugs are very expensive – here’s how we work out value for our money


It suggests each life year saved as a result of keeping bars and restaurants closed costs around $12.5 million.

Decisions on whether government should fund health interventions are commonly based on an assessment of whether the health gains justify the additional costs.

As a ballpark figure, new measures are funded if they are shown to gain an additional life year at a cost of around $50,000.

This suggests that by keeping bars and restaurants closed the government is paying 250 times more than it would usually pay to gain a life year.

It is funding that doesn’t pass the usual test

A separate guideline used by Australian governments to assess regulations and infrastructure projects puts the value of a statistical life year at $200,389 in today’s dollars.

This suggests that by keeping bars and restaurants closed the government is paying 60 times more than it would usually pay to save a life.

It’s why we think governments should reopen them, next week.

Like all such analyses, ours depends on the assumptions used.

We have put a spreadsheet of our decision tree online to allow readers to experiment with different ones.




Read more:
It’s hard to know when to come out from under the doona. It’ll be soon, but not yet


Our analysis leaves much out. It includes neither the negative impact of COVID-19 on people’s quality of life, nor the negative impact of shutting bars and restaurants on people’s health and quality of life.

It gives us an indication of how many life years the government is saving for the $600 million per week it is costing it to keep bars and restaurants closed.

It suggests the government could save many more life years by spending the money in a different way.The Conversation

Jonathan Karnon, Professor of Health Economics, Flinders University and Ben W. Mol, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Monash University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Missing evidence base for big calls on infrastructure costs us all


Hugh Batrouney, Grattan Institute

When the case for big transport projects is made without due analysis, we risk building the wrong projects. The result is we waste billions of dollars and rob ourselves of the infrastructure our booming cities need to be more liveable. Given how fast our big cities are growing, we simply can’t afford to make decisions based on limited or misleading information. Yet this keeps happening.

Two stark examples – proposed rail links to Western Sydney and Melbourne airports and road congestion charges – illustrate the problem in different ways.

The proposed airport rail links show how governments continue to make huge taxpayer commitments to projects before they are able to articulate the costs, benefits and risks.

In the case of proposed road congestion charges we see an important reform languishing. This is because when reforms rest on obscure or unclear analysis they inevitably fail to generate public support.


Read more: Western Sydney Aerotropolis won’t build itself – a lot is riding on what governments do
Airport rail link can open up new possibilities for the rest of Melbourne


Funding pledges don’t wait for a business case

In the case of the recently announced multi-billion-dollar investments in airport rail in Western Sydney and Melbourne, neither project has a business case. Yet politicians on both sides tripped over themselves in committing to building them.

There are good reasons to be wary of their eagerness. A government study released this year stated that Western Sydney airport rail wouldn’t be needed to cater for customers and workers at the airport until 2036 at the earliest. Without a business case, we have no way to understand the grounds on which the government still believes this project represents value for money.




Read more:
Flying into uncertainty: Western Sydney’s ‘aerotropolis’ poses more questions than answers


In the case of Melbourne airport rail, the project’s route hasn’t been resolved, let alone its costs, ticket pricing structure, or potential benefits. Infrastructure Australia’s most recent priority list did not include a proponent for the project.

And Infrastructure Victoria says upgrading airport bus services should be investigated first. This is because, at A$50-100 million, bus services would be a much cheaper way to tackle the same problem. It has also said the rail line should be delivered – but not for at least 15 years.




Read more:
Melbourne Airport is going to be as busy as Heathrow, so why the argument about one train line?


Touting estimated benefits without showing calculations

The second example of Australia’s transport planning information deficit is different but still damaging. It concerns the way infrastructure experts encourage governments to make worthwhile but politically challenging reforms to how we use existing infrastructure. The idea is to get more value from the assets we already have.

Infrastructure Australia advocates a road congestion tax. This would replace annual registration fees and petrol taxes with a scheme that charges motorists more when they travel in congested places at congested times.

It’s a very good idea. Indeed, a Grattan Institute report last year recommended governments think seriously about road congestion charges for Sydney and Melbourne. But the way Infrastructure Australia has mounted the case leaves a lot to be desired.




Read more:
Delay in changing direction on how we tax drivers will cost us all


Last month, Infrastructure Australia released estimates of the benefits, prepared with PwC, of a scheme to charge motorists more precisely according to the location, time and distances they travel. According to these estimates, in just over a decade, Australia’s GDP would be A$21 billion larger every year – and this would increase to A$36.5 billion a year by 2047.

The problem is that Infrastructure Australia provides little information about how these enormous numbers were calculated. In a flawless example of circular reasoning, IA refers to analysis done by PwC. PwC in turn notes that the estimates were “collaboratively developed by IA and PwC”.

The calculations do not appear to have included the costs of implementing and running such a scheme. And we have been told nothing about how this grand plan might work in practice.

Converting reductions in travel times to increases in GDP

The most commonly cited estimates of the “avoidable costs” of congestion in Australia come from the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics. In 2015, BITRE estimated the annual costs for Australia’s eight capitals totalled about A$16.5 billion. This was forecast to rise to about A$30 billion by 2030.

Such estimates have been important in highlighting the fact that congestion is not just aggravating but costly. But such estimates are, as BITRE itself states, “very blunt instruments for estimating and projecting congestion occurrence”.

It is difficult to precisely convert estimates of avoidable congestion costs into changes in GDP, of course. But the new Infrastructure Australia estimates do not even follow some simple, but important, rules of modelling.

First, they don’t make it easy for readers to see the basis for the assumptions used. Second, they don’t appear to have factored in costs as well as benefits. And third, in a situation where significant uncertainty surrounds the estimates, they haven’t published a range for the estimated impacts.

Getting transport projects right is critically important in cities that are already under pressure. Yet too many big infrastructure calls in Australia are based on misleading information or wafer-thin evidence. We need to do better.


The Conversation


Read more:
Budget policy check: do we need ribbon-cutting infrastructure for jobs and growth?


Hugh Batrouney, Transport Fellow, Grattan Institute

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Cancer costs Australia nearly $2 billion per year in lost labour



File 20180405 189801 u3s5n0.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1
A new study calls for additional support from government, employers and the medical profession for cancer survivors wanting to return to work.
from shutterstock.com

Antolin Bonnett, The Conversation

Australia loses nearly A$2 billion of GDP every year due to people with cancer leaving the workforce.

A study published today in BMC Public Health showed that 67% of Australians of working age (25-64) diagnosed with cancer reported changes to their employment in 2015, such as reduced hours and stopping work. Around 50,000 people with cancer weren’t working at all.

The authors calculated this equated to a loss of A$1.7 billion in GDP.

Compared to the workforce rates of other long-term health conditions, such as chronic epilepsy, heart disease and diabetes, those with cancer were almost twice as likely to not be in the workforce.

A previous report showed loss of productivity due to cancer diagnosis accounts for around 54% of the total lifetime cost of cancer. This is compared to only 29% in direct costs, such as medical treatment.

Previous studies show around 40% of cancer survivors will return to work after treatment at six months following a diagnosis, and 89% after two years.

The authors called for additional support from government, employers and the medical profession for cancer survivors wanting to return to work.

Lead author and lecturer at James Cook University, Nicole Bates, said returning to work was “an important milestone, both financially and emotionally”.

Australians with a cancer diagnosis who didn’t have a tertiary qualification were nearly four times as likely to not be working as those who did. Other factors affecting work status included having a manual labour job, less flexible working arrangement, and the type of cancer and treatment.




Read more:
We need more support systems for people who want to work during and after cancer treatment


Professor and medical oncologist at Flinders University, Bogda Koczwara, said lack of flexible employment was a significant roadblock to cancer survivors re-entering the workforce. She added Australian systems only allowed people to be either “on or off”.

“In Australia, there isn’t a lot of room for return to employment. Sometimes a person may be willing to return to work but not capable of doing so at full capacity. But they’re better off staying at home and claiming full insurance than going back to work partially because that way they lose their payments,” she said.

Professor Koczwara, who was not involved in the study, also said it was important to not only consider medical ways to assist cancer patients returning to work.

Miss Bates said employers could work with the cancer survivor and their medical professionals to “enable returning to work within their capabilities”.

Director of the Australian Healthy Policy Collaboration at Victoria University, Rosemary Calder, said it would be useful to explore how cancers that shared common risk factors with preventable chronic diseases contributed to the productivity impact.

“Given what we know about the shared risk factors for some cancers and other chronic diseases, if we invested in prevention of these risk factors, we potentially could reduce the productivity impact of cancers related to those risk factors,” she said.




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The researchers analysed data from the 2015 Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers according to education, health condition, and employment status.

The study was limited by its inability to differentiate the rates of workforce participation of those currently undergoing treatment compared to those in remission.

The ConversationThis article has been updated to include other long-term health conditions that affected return to work, and clarify that the estimated loss of productivity due to cancer compared to direct medical costs was from a previous report.

Antolin Bonnett, Editorial Intern, The Conversation

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

As costs mount, the government should abandon the Cashless Debit Card


File 20171210 27677 12248fl.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1
The Cashless Debit Card trial disproportionately targets Indigenous people, despite what the government says.
AAP/Richard Milnes

Elise Klein, University of Melbourne

A Senate inquiry has recommended that trials of the Cashless Debit Card be continued and expanded to new sites in other states next year. This is despite Labor and Greens senators providing separate dissenting reports that rejected the recommendation that legislation for the bill should pass.

The majority report’s proposal dramatically contrasts with most of the submissions accepted by the inquiry raising significant concerns and arguing against the trials. These submissions outline a variety of serious issues that have been largely overlooked.

What is the card?

The trials for the Cashless Debit Card began in early 2016 in Ceduna, South Australia, and the East Kimberley in Western Australia.

The card quarantines 80% of social security payments received by all working-age people (between the ages of 15 and 64) in the trial sites. It attempts to restrict cash and purchases of alcohol, illegal drugs and gambling products.

The card compulsorily includes people receiving disability, parenting, carers, unemployed and youth allowance payments. People on the aged pension, on a veteran’s payment or earning a wage are not compulsorily included in the trial, but can volunteer to take part.

The issues left unanswered

The trial disproportionately targets Indigenous people, despite the government claiming the card is for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare recipients. This is disingenuous, given the card was first proposed as a key recommendation in mining magnate Andrew Forrest’s Review of Indigenous Training and Employment.

This recommendation followed various other forms of income management, including a program that was part of the Northern Territory Intervention in 2007.

The Intervention required the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act to explicitly target all Indigenous people on welfare. Concerns about human rights breaches continue, and most were overlooked by the Human Rights Joint Committee’s commentary on the Cashless Debit Card bill.

The trial of the card has increased hardship in people’s lives. This is not only because of the experiment’s disorganised and ill-conceived implementation, but also due to the trial’s design.

People are being compulsory included because there is an assumption that they engage in problematic behaviours, such as the over-consumption of alcohol, gambling, or the use of illegal drugs. But this is not the reality for most people.

Being put on the card has made people’s lives harder because limiting cash restricts people’s ability to undertake day-to-day activities to help their family’s wellbeing. This includes getting second-hand goods, paying for transport, and buying gifts.

This hardship is reflected in the final evaluation of the trial, in which 32% said their lives were worse since being on the card (only 23% said their lives were better).

Further, 48% of participants reported that the card does not help them look after their children better. This is concerning, as recently completed research into income management programs indicates a correlation with negative impacts on children – including a reduction in birth weight and school attendance.

Getting the assumptions wrong has pushed already vulnerable people into even more vulnerable situations. Medical specialists have raised concerns with the card being used to treat addiction.

Both crime and domestic assaults increased under the card in the East Kimberley. Superintendent Adams of the Kimberley Police District told the Senate inquiry that in the 12 months to June 30, 2016, there were 319 domestic assaults in Kununurra, but in the 12 months to June 30, 2017 (and the time of the trial), this figure had increased to 508.

Flawed evidence

The government used both the interim and final evaluations as key evidence to justify extending the trials.

Both evaluations have been severely criticised as being methodologically and analytically flawed: from the way interviews were conducted, to having no baseline to test government claims of success, through to an over-emphasis on anecdotal improvements and discarding important issues such as the increase in crime and domestic violence.

The decision to implement the card was not a community decision that represents the regions’ diverse interests or population. And some have had more say than others.

For example, the Miriuwung Gajerrong Corporation noted that, although the:

… Department of Social Services states that the Cashless Debit Card program was co-designed with local leaders in Kununurra … in reality, only four local leaders were consulted in relation to the introduction of the [card] in Kununurra.

Consultations themselves have not been about co-design, but have been tokenistic to convince people to support the card.

In a perverse twist, the only way people can get themselves off the trial is to get a job. Yet in both Ceduna and the East Kimberley, the biggest cause of unemployment is the lack of formal, dignified and secure jobs. Linking to unemployment, some people included in the trial are also subjected to the punitive Community Development Program. This compounds poverty, as the program’s nature induces high breaching rates.

Even if a few support the card, many more have suffered material and emotional hardship. The community has been fractured through such heavy-handed intervention. And the A$25 million spent on it has demonstrated no credible evidence of sufficient benefit to justify an ongoing rollout.

That the card continues to be pursued by government exposes its dogged obsession with implementing neocolonial and punitive policy for some imagined political gain at the expense of vulnerable people.


The ConversationThe author would like to thank professor Jon Altman and Sarouche Razi for comments on earlier drafts.

Elise Klein, Lecturer in Development Studies, University of Melbourne

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Australian IT Costs More – 50% More!!!


The link below is to an article that should have Aussies seeing red – we are paying up to 50% more than we should be for IT products, which is of little real surprise to most of us. Right across the board we have been paying more and there seems to be no real reason for it to be so other than the greed of big business.

For more visit:
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/personal-tech/australians-pay-50-per-cent-more-for-tech-goods/story-e6frgazf-1226687429151