How Pakistan stands to gain — or lose — from the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan

Jafar Khan/AP

Muhammad Nadeem Malik, The University of MelbournePakistan has long played a critical, yet confusing role in Afghanistan. It has been one of the strongest US allies in its “war on terror”, yet it has also covertly backed the Taliban in its fight against US-led forces for years.

The paradox remained visible after the Taliban swept into Kabul last week.

Pakistan’s official response by its foreign minister was hope for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan through an inclusive, transition government following broad-based consultations with all ethnic groups and stakeholders.

Moreover, in a televised address, Pakistan’s army chief urged the Taliban leaders to fulfil their promise to the international community regarding respect for women’s rights and human rights

Both statements align with America’s aspirations. But in contrast, Prime Minister Imran Khan declared that Afghans had broken “the shackles of slavery”, which seems to mock the US establishment.

How regional powers are responding

Despite this mixed messaging from Pakistani leaders, a coordinated regional response to the Taliban takeover appears to be shaping up.

As western countries hold back from recognising the new government, the regional powers of Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan have kept their embassies open in Kabul and expressed their willingness to work with the Taliban.

According to a senior security journalist I spoke with in Pakistan, both Russia and Iran supported the Taliban fight against the US-sponsored Afghanistan government to contain the threat from the Islamic State.

Iran’s influence on the Taliban can be gauged by the fact the group’s leadership participated in the Shia’ Majlis (a religious council delivering sermons) in Kabul after its takeover, which is highly unusual for the extremist Sunni Taliban.

Moreover, Iran and Russia have been so involved in Afghanistan and the politics of the Taliban that when then-President Donald Trump cancelled a planned meeting with Taliban leaders in late 2019, the group reacted by going to both countries to get advice from their leaders on how to respond.

Overall, the strategies of these regional powers will greatly influence the politics in Afghanistan in the coming days — but it’s Pakistan that likely has the greatest sway over the Taliban leaders.

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Afghanistan: western powers must accept defeat and deal realistically with the Taliban

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A brief history of Pakistan’s support for the Taliban

Pakistan has provided political and military support for different factions within Afghanistan since the early 1970s. During the 1980s, Pakistan was a major backer of the Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) fighting against the Soviet invasion and hosted millions Afghan refugees fleeing the war.

Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War in 1987.
Wikimedia Commons

Pakistan was also a major ally of the US at this time. The US channelled some US$2-3 billion (A$2.7-4.1 billion) worth of covert assistance through Pakistan to the mujahideen, training over 80,000 of the fighters.

Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Pakistani military officers continued to provide training and guidance to the mujahideen and eventually to Taliban forces to combat their enemies.

In addition, senior members of Pakistan’s intelligence agency and army are accused of helping the Taliban plan major military operations against the government during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s. Pakistani support for the group attracted widespread international criticism, including from then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who called it “deeply distressing”.

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As Afghanistan falls, what does it mean for the Middle East?

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Pakistan was then just one of three countries to officially recognise the new Taliban government when it took power in 1996.

General Hamid Gul, a former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), acknowledged in 2014 that Pakistan even used US aid to continue funding the Taliban after the September 11 terror attacks.

He told a television audience,

When history is written, it will be stated that the ISI defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with the help of America. Then there will be another sentence. The ISI, with the help of America, defeated America.

Pakistan is still likely to provide covert political and logistic support to the new Taliban leaders in Afghanistan today.

In the past, the Taliban leadership had three consultative councils, known as shuras, based in Pakistan. At least one of these shuras, based in Quetta, still probably seems to be operating from Pakistan.

The Taliban also operated in the country throughout the American occupation in Afghanistan, even though the Pakistan government denies supporting the group and denies the existence of the Quetta shura.

Given this history, it’s no wonder many people around the world are blaming Pakistan for the Taliban’s recent military success, reflected in the #SanctionPakistan campaign on Twitter.

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As the Taliban surges across Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is poised for a swift return

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What does Pakistan stand to gain or lose?

Pakistan’s biggest gain is that India will lose its influence in Afghanistan, which was seen as a threat to Pakistan’s security. The Taliban takeover also allows Pakistan to boost its bilateral trade with Afghanistan and provides an unrestricted trade route to the countries of central Asia.

However, Pakistan can lose from the Taliban’s ascendancy, as well. If the Taliban fails to ensure stability, this can trigger another wave of refugees crossing the border. The Taliban’s takeover could also embolden domestic terror groups within Pakistan.

As a result, Taliban rule in Afghanistan could have adverse security repercussions for Pakistan, particularly with regard to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The TTP considers the takeover of Afghanistan by its Afghan counterparts a significant ideological victory.

The TTP has launched several violent attacks in Pakistan over the years, including an attack on a school in Peshawar in 2014 that killed more than 150 people, mostly children.

A candlelight vigil for the victims of a school attacked by the Taliban in Peshawar in 2014.
Anjum Naveed/AP

Some of the TTP’s leaders were also reportedly freed from prisons by Afghan Taliban fighters in recent days.

As a former member of Pakistan’s parliament told the Financial Times, “a stable Afghanistan will work in Pakistan’s favour”.

The key to creating peace and stability in Afghanistan will be Pakistan’s strategic cooperation with all of the regional powers, as well as the US. Such cooperation, however, may be a challenge to achieve, given the competing interests that have long torn this country apart.

Muhammad Nadeem Malik, Senior Lecturer, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Pakistan and Violence Against Women

Kashmir

Pakistan – India Tensions Over Kashmir

India revokes Kashmir’s autonomy, risking yet another war with Pakistan

Kamran Khalid, University of Sydney

Tensions are on the rise in Jammu and Kashmir, an Indian state situated mostly in the Himalayas. For decades, it has had constitutional autonomy from India.

The region is an area of major territorial conflict between India and Pakistan. Parts of the Kashmir valley have been under Pakistan’s control since the 1948 Indo-Pakistani war and both India and Pakistan have since fought two more wars claiming title to Jammu and the whole of Kashmir.

But yesterday, the Indian Home Minister Amit Shah announced the government’s decision to take away Jammu and Kashmir’s special status. This status gave it the independence to have its own constitution, flag and the ability to make its own laws for its residents.

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India, Pakistan and the changing rules of engagement: here’s what you need to know

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To do this, the government has abolished Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution, and announced a plan to divide the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories.

In recent weeks, India has discharged some 35,000 troops to the Indian parts of Kashmir, adding to the 500,000 troops already stationed in the territory. India also cancelled a major Hindu pilgrimage, asked tourists to leave and imposed curfews in parts of the state.

What’s more, major Jammu and Kashmir politicians, including two former chief ministers, have been arrested, schools and colleges have shut, and communication facilities have been suspended.

India cites the threat of militancy in the territory emanating from Pakistan as the reason for recent lockdown and security measures.

So what happens now?

From now on, Jammu and Kashmir will be considered a part of India, the same as other Indian states. It will be subject to the Indian constitution in its entirety.

The Indian government, following its election promises, claims that removing the special status will provide better economic and political opportunities in Jammu and Kashmir, the same as those available in mainland India.

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Read more:
India Tomorrow part 3: Kashmir

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But skeptics believe that such a rushed move is merely a cover for changing the demographics of the Muslim-majority Kashmir to make it more Hindu, in the same way Israel expanded into Palestinian territories.

The abolition of Article 35A removes a constitutional hurdle for foreigners to buy land, settle in Jammu and Kashmir and increase the non-Muslim population there.

Until now, the expansion of the non-Muslim population was restricted due to strict property, political and entrepreneurial state laws for non-residents.

What does Article 370 do?

Adopted in 1949, Article 370 grants Jammu and Kashmir an autonomous status under the Indian constitution.

The article exempts the state from the terms of the constitution and limits the Indian Parliament in making laws for Jammu and Kashmir, except on matters of defence, external affairs and communications.

The Jammu and Kashmir legislature must approve any other law the Indian Parliament passes before it takes effect.

The article states that specific provisions in the Indian constitution can be extended to Jammu and Kashmir through presidential orders. But this can only happen with the agreement of the state government.

One such provision is Article 35A, which was passed through a presidential order in 1954. It allowed the Jammu and Kashmir legislature to define rights and privileges for the permanent residents of the territory.

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Kashmir conflict is not just a border dispute between India and Pakistan

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Article 370 was first adopted as a temporary term under the “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions” section of India’s constitution when India had committed to holding a plebiscite in the territory to let the residents decide their political future.

But how valid is India’s move?

According to India’s constitution, Article 370 could only be modified or revoked at the recommendation of Jammu and Kashmir’s constituent assembly. The constituent assembly, however, dissolved itself in the 1950s, arguably entrenching Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy in the Indian constitution permanently.

This means that abolishing Article 370 through yesterday’s presidential notification may be unconstitutional. And if this is the case, revoking the existing constitutional authority means India would be ruling Jammu and Kashmir by force.

Is conflict likely?

The predominantly Muslim Kashmiri population has strong reservations about an influx of Indians into their homelands, particularly since 2008. Then, the Jammu and Kashmir government agreed to grant 40 hectares of forestland to a Hindu pilgrimage site to provide for housing facilities for pilgrims, but was met with strong public protests against the idea.

Over the years, despite the Kashmiris’ concerns, the Indian right-wing groups, with the help of central government, have been encouraging Hindus to undertake the pilgrimage in big numbers.

Recently, US President Donald Trump offered to mediate the territorial conflict between Pakistan and India for a solution to the decades-old crises.

India has always maintained the dispute to be a bilateral issue between the two countries and refused to accept any third party’s involvement. Pakistan, on the other hand, regards it an international issue which, similar to the Israel-Palestine conflict, requires the UN and other international players to play their parts.

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How the dangerous evolution of Pakistan’s national security state threatens domestic stability

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But bringing Jammu and Kashmir under India’s rule means this dispute will become more internalised between the two countries. This is concerning to Pakistan and could, once again, reignite border tensions between the two countries.

Kamran Khalid, PhD Candidate, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Pakistan: Persecution News Update

The links below are to articles reporting on news of the persecution of Christians in Pakistan (the most recent articles are at the top).

For more visit:
– https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/09/family-claims-christian-teen-kidnapped-forcefully-converted-islam-pakistan/
– https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/05/icc-aids-victim-false-blasphemy-accusation/
– https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/02/christian-family-pakistan-left-homeless-following-mob-attack/

How the dangerous evolution of Pakistan’s national security state threatens domestic stability

Protests followed the terrorist attack that killed more than 40 Indian military personnel in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
AAP/Jaipal Singh, CC BY-ND

Robert G. Patman, University of Otago and Dr Arshad Ali, University of Otago

In February, a terrorist attack by Jaysh e-Mohammad (JeM) killed more than 40 Indian military personnel in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It triggered the worst escalation of India–Pakistan tensions for nearly two decades.

The flare-up was a stark reminder that the Kashmir conflict appears to be intractable, with especially dangerous consequences for the weaker party, Pakistan.

At great economic cost, Pakistan has constructed a nuclear-armed national security state over many decades to counter the Indian “threat”. This somewhat ossified approach has done little to improve security in South Asia.

It is also generating dangerous new threats to stability inside the country.

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Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses the risk

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The militarisation of Pakistan during the Cold War

Kashmir has been in a geopolitical limbo, with a disputed border, ever since partition in 1947. The conflicting Indian and Pakistani claims to sovereignty over Kashmir have helped generate the emergence of a Pakistani national security state in which the military became a dominant political actor.

The Pakistan military has received the lion’s share of national resources and began acquiring nuclear weapons during the 1970s. But it has also played a key role in framing Islamabad’s national security policy.

Because Pakistan was struggling to compete with India, which is much larger in terms of territory, population, economy and military power, it needed external support. The Cold War provided an opportunity for Pakistan to make an alliance with the US, which was looking to contain the Soviet Union in South Asia. In February 1954, the Eisenhower administration announced it was providing military assistance to Pakistan.

American assistance significantly strengthened the role of the military and enabled it to become the key actor in Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The civilian bureaucracy cooperated with the Pakistani military in a pragmatic fashion to help it exercise political control during the Cold War.

The Pakistani judiciary provided legal justifications for military rule when required. Consequently, the Pakistani military ruled the country directly for 24 years from 1947 to 1988. During this period the parliamentary system was undermined and a “controlled democracy” became the norm.

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India, Pakistan and the changing rules of engagement: here’s what you need to know

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Growing post-Cold War threats

The Pakistani military also used its political and administrative autonomy to establish its own commercial ventures. This included road building, real estate, cement factories and private banks. By establishing its own version of a military industrial complex, the Pakistani military assumed a dominant position in the country’s national security policies.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) emerged during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s as a second key player. Civilian political parties or leaders in Pakistan were effectively constrained in national security decision-making by a military-led coalition that encompassed intelligence agencies, the civil bureaucracy and the judiciary.

The end of the Cold War did little to diminish Pakistan’s fixation with the Kashmir conflict. Its intense rivalry with India continued in South Asia, including in war-torn Afghanistan. But the post-Cold War era changed the strategic equation.

First, India embarked on a successful process of economic liberalisation in the early 1990s. This significantly widened the wealth gap between a rising India and a desperately poor Pakistan.

Second, the US no longer needed Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s and drastically reduced its military support for Islamabad.

But the Pakistani national security state showed little willingness to adapt to the realities of a transformed strategic environment. Islamabad persisted with its involvement in proxy wars in Kashmir. It supported militant Islamist forces opposing the Indian presence and, in Afghanistan, it supported Taliban militants in a bid to counter Indian influence in that country.

In the post-Cold War context, Pakistan’s stance on national security has largely failed to balance India’s preponderance and generated significant new internal security threats from factions of Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and other militant groups.

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The war on terror and Pakistan’s dangerous double game

The 9/11 attacks helped restore Pakistan’s position as a key strategic partner of America in Washington’s war on terror. But the country’s national security state continued to pursue its anti-Indian agenda in Kashmir and Afghanistan, while ostensibly cooperating with US administrations in hunting down al-Qaeda terrorists in South Asia.

Osama bin Laden was eventually killed at a hideout inside Pakistan in May 2011, not far from a major Pakistani army base. This double game not only frustrated Washington, it also led to dangerous blowback at home.

Since the US-led war on terror, Pakistan’s internal security has been increasingly threatened by the activities of Taliban militants and the influx of al-Qaeda operatives into the country from neighbouring Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, Pakistan has experienced a gradual shift to more democratic processes. Nevertheless, the military has continued to play a dominant role in the making of foreign and security policy.

Today, Pakistan is a country in desperate need of peace and stability. But unless Pakistan’s national security state is reformed and brought under full civilian control, it is difficult to see how the country can reverse an ominous pattern of domestic instability and economic decline.

Robert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of Otago and Dr Arshad Ali, Researcher, University of Otago

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

India, Pakistan and the changing rules of engagement: here’s what you need to know

Stuti Bhatnagar, University of Adelaide and Priya Chacko, University of Adelaide

More than 40 Indian security staff lost their lives in a suicide attack on February 14, 2019 in the Pulwama region of Indian-administered Kashmir. The Pakistan-based Islamist militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for the attack.

Twelve days later, India launched air strikes against JeM training camps in Balakot, Pakistan. India claimed the strikes inflicted significant damage on infrastructure and killed militant commanders, while avoiding civilians.

India said the strikes were “pre-emptive”, based on intelligence that JeM were planning more suicide attacks in Indian territory. Pakistan denied India’s claims, both about the damage done by their airstrikes and that Pakistan was planning further attacks.

But Pakistan retaliated with an airstrike on what it termed a “non-military installation” in the Indian controlled region of Kashmir. In the ensuing skirmish with the Indian Air Force, an Indian jet was downed and a pilot captured.

These events, in the disputed territory of Kashmir, have brought international attention to the prospect of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. But why is the decades-long conflict heating up again, and why now?

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Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses the risk

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History of Kashmir

India and Pakistan have been involved in a territorial dispute over Kashmir for decades. The roots of the conflict lie in the partition of British India in 1947, which created the secular state of India and the Muslim state of Pakistan.

The idea behind the partition was for Muslim-majority regions to become a part of Pakistan. But Kashmir was complicated. Although a Muslim-majority state, it was ruled by a Hindu king.

He decided to accede to India in October 1947. This was unacceptable to Pakistan, which launched a war in 1948 to capture Kashmir by force.

A result of the war was a UN-mediated ceasefire line. This divided Kashmir into Indian-administered “Jammu and Kashmir” (J&K) – which constituted two-thirds of the territory – and Pakistan-administered “Azad (free) Kashmir”, which was one-third of the territory.

While the 1948 ceasefire brought an end to the fighting, Kashmir’s status remained unresolved and Pakistan continued to contest the territorial boundaries. India granted J&K constitutional autonomy, while the Pakistan-administered region was a self-governing entity.

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Why Kashmir is still ensnared in conflict after 70 years

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View from Pakistan

Kashmir is central to Pakistan’s national identity as a Muslim state, and therefore it represents unfinished business after the 1947 partition.

Pakistan launched another war against India in 1965, which caused thousands of casualties on both sides. Hostilities between the two countries ended after a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States and a UN-mandated ceasefire.

The 1965 war, the 1971 Indian intervention in Pakistan’s civil war, and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh led to more changes to the territorial borders in Kashmir. The ceasefire line is now designated as the Line of Control (LoC).

The Line of Control divides the Indian and Pakistani territories of Kashmir.
Wikimedia Commons

Since the 1990s, Pakistan has supported militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to attack Indian security forces and civilians.

View from India

Kashmir has also been central to India’s national narrative of unity in diversity propagated by leaders of the independence movement, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. Indian leaders have often projected the accommodation of a Muslim majority state in the J&K region as proof of Indian secular democracy.

India’s official position considers the whole of undivided Kashmir as a part of India. And India has not consistently upheld J&K’s constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy. Political instability in the state has been compounded by interference from the Indian government. Indian armed forces in the area have often used force against civilians.

In the 1990s, this led to a mass uprising and insurgency among the Kashmiri population in India. Pakistan exploited this discontent, offering arms, training and funds to both Pakistan-based and local Kashmiri militants.

The insurgency in Indian Kashmir eased in 2003, with a ceasefire and the initiation of an India-Pakistan peace process that led to a relative period of calm.

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Kashmir conflict is not just a border dispute between India and Pakistan

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The peace process came to an end after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, carried out by the LeT. But India’s policy of strategic restraint and pressure on Pakistan by the United States to address militancy prevented a worsening of hostilities.

A new government came to power in India in 2014, led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. The leadership’s approach to Pakistan and Kashmir has been significantly different from the previous administration, with more emphasis on curbing dissent in J&K and using pre-emptive strikes across the LoC against militant groups in Pakistan’s territory.

Local discontent in Indian Kashmir has also led to an increase in militancy since 2014 with more Pakistani support and a combination of rising local recruitment and an influx of foreign militants.

What does this mean?

The rules of engagement between India and Pakistan are changing. India’s “pre-emptive” air strikes in February were a significant shift away from the previous policy of strategic restraint. This is the first time since the dispute emerged that India has targeted militants inside Pakistani territory.

Pakistan chose to escalate tensions further, a move that had previously been prevented by the US. Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan, has reiterated his desire for dialogue with India. But ceasefire violations across the LoC and the international border have continued unabated since February 14k, with both sides reporting civilian casualties.

Diplomatic pressure from the UN and the rest of the international community has forced the Pakistani government to ban some militant groups. Yet, it continues to deny that JeM is active in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, tensions with Pakistan are playing well into Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s promotion of being a “strong leader”, capable of protecting the country from its enemies. This is all part of the strategy leading up to the coming elections.

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Kashmir: India and Pakistan’s escalating conflict will benefit Narendra Modi ahead of elections

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The escalatory responses by both governments have shown the actions of the two countries are becoming more difficult to control, particularly with the United States’ lack of involvement in defusing tensions as it disengages from the region.

Stuti Bhatnagar, Adjunct Fellow, University of Adelaide and Priya Chacko, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Adelaide

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

As Pakistan’s PM, Imran Khan must embrace compromise. Can he deliver on his promises?

Samina Yasmeen, University of Western Australia

Once a global cricket star, Imran Khan is now poised to become Pakistan’s new prime minister. But he’s likely to find that running a country is much more difficult than winning the vote; the July election that brought him to power has also left his party short of a clear parliamentary majority.

Forced to form a coalition in parliament, Khan will have to compromise if he’s to have any hope of tackling key issues in Pakistan – myriad economic, environmental, foreign policy and social welfare challenges – while trying to deliver on his vision for “naya Pakistan” (new Pakistan).

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Imran Khan hopes to transform Pakistan but he’ll have far less power than past leaders

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Rise to power

Khan formed his political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), in 1996 and persevered for years to muster support for his vision for “naya Pakistan”. His electoral success is also partly explained by his popularity as the cricket captain who won the World Cup for Pakistan in 1992.

In a country that feverishly loves cricket, Khan creatively used “cricket-speak” in his campaigning and employed a cricket bat as his electoral symbol. But his success has predominantly resulted from pre-polling orchestration and support from the military, which provided him space for electioneering while denying similar opportunities for other contestants. In other words, he has learnt the art of politics.

Khan’s chief rival was the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whose administration was toppled over corruption allegations. When the nation’s top court declared him ineligible to hold public office – a move Sharif decried as “judicial martial law” – his party was left weakened. Khan’s party, the PTI, reaped the benefits.

Khan used the cricket bat symbol in his election material.
Aine Moorad / Shutterstock.com

Following the July vote, the PTI secured 116 of the 270 seats contested in the National Assembly, with rival parties PML-N and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) securing only 64 and 43 seats, respectively.

Falling short of a clear majority, Khan’s PTI party has opted for coalition politics. It has joined forces with independently elected representatives and a wide variety of political parties, including the Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA), the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP).

The coalition is also poised to form three of the four provincial governments: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Balochistan and Punjab. Of these, Punjab is the jewel in the crown, with half of the country’s 208 million people, and where the PML-N has lost its traditional power base to the PTI. But ensuring the sustainability of coalition government at provincial level remains a challenge, especially as local tensions intersect with the eternal strain between central and regional governments.

The coalition is also poised to form three of the four provincial governments: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Balochistan and Punjab.
Shutterstock

Foriegn policy woes and domestic tensions

In the foreign policy arena, Pakistan faces mounting US pressure and has been placed on the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

The military has increasingly sought to control Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially its relationships with India, Afghanistan, the US, Iran and the Gulf States. We shouldn’t expect huge change on that front. Judging by the PTI manifesto and Khan’s first post-election address, the new government will continue to operate within the parameters established by the military.

Khan’s PTI party faces domestic economic woes, too. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves have dwindled from US$17.5 billion in April to US$9.66 billion in June. Economic growth has slowed, the rupee has been devalued and Pakistan is seeking a US$12 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund.

https://d3fy651gv2fhd3.cloudfront.net/embed/?s=pakistanforexcres&v=201806291527v&d1=20170101&d2=20181231&h=300&w=600

Can Khan deliver?

Khan acknowledges these challenges, and has proffered solutions. He’s talked about learning from China the art of rapidly lifting people out of poverty and promised to cut government spending.

But the capacity of the government to deliver on these promises cannot be guaranteed. Traditionally, Pakistan’s regional and national leaders have used their local influence to sustain their respective power bases at the cost of ordinary citizens. Khan’s PTI party has engaged a number of these “electables” for its electoral success, but such people are unlikely to embrace change beyond a certain level.

The biggest challenge remains the tide of rising expectations in Pakistan. Khan says his vision of “naya Pakistan” means combating corruption and nepotism, promoting merit-based decisions at all levels, increasing accountability and boosting access to education and health services.

Such aspirations are noble, but he will need more than five years to achieve all this in a country in which the powerful are privileged and the powerless usually ignored.

This is not to suggest that nothing can or will change in Pakistan.

But change may be so slow that young people (who make up 64% of the population) could grow increasingly disillusioned.

Pakistan’s political history may repeat itself. Former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (who was also the father of another Pakistani leader, Benazir Bhutto) similarly heightened expectations among the poor in the 1960s with a suite of promises. His inability to deliver on them pushed the country towards 11 years of military rule.

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Imran Khan’s battles have only just begun, after Pakistan’s ‘dirtiest election’

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The growing power of Pakistan’s religious groups is an even bigger challenge. Traditional Islamist parties have not fared well in the elections. But one such party, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), secured 2.2 million votes, in contrast to the 6.8 million votes for the left-leaning Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by Benazir Bhutto’s son Bilawal.

If PTI fails to deliver on Khan’s promise of a “new Pakistan”, the TLP or other militant outfits could entice more young people to join their cause.

After the celebrations for Khan’s victory are over, we must be realistic about the likelihood for rapid change in Pakistan.

Samina Yasmeen, Director of Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Pakistan: Is Imran Khan the Man for the Job?