New Caledonia votes to stay with France this time, but independence supporters take heart



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Voting is not compulsory in New Caledonia, but nonetheless 80.63% turned out to vote in the independence referendum.
Shutterstock

Denise Fisher, Australian National University

The November 4 referendum in New Caledonia was a breathtaking example of democracy in action, with new consequences for the French territory, France and our region.

The vote had been long-deferred, long-awaited and for some, long-feared. It took place peacefully, a major and poignant achievement that was unimaginable 30 years ago, before the Matignon/Noumea Accords were signed. They were designed to end civil war, promising the hand-over of a number of autonomies, to be followed by this referendum.

The result favoured staying with France by 56.4% to 43.6%. Key characteristics were the strong turnout, especially by young Kanaks, the relatively strong vote for independence, and bitter division between the two sides.




Read more:
Explainer: New Caledonia’s independence referendum, and how it could impact the region


Voting queues were long, with many waiting two hours to vote. Voting is not compulsory in New Caledonia, and the turnout was an extraordinary 80.63% of those eligible to vote (all Indigenous Kanaks, and a large proportion of those from other communities with longstanding residence in New Caledonia). This is the highest in recent history, with levels at the last French national elections 37% (2017) and provincial elections 67% (2014).

As French President Emmanuel Macron noted hours after the polls closed, France has fulfilled its promise and delivered a transparent process, legitimised by the unprecedented high turnout, the attendance of 13 UN observers and a Pacific Islands Forum observer team.

What does it mean for New Caledonia?

This relatively close result is probably the best all round for stability. The campaign has been bitter, and even commentary between leaders in television coverage of the results saw strong denunciation, particularly by loyalists.

While potentially stoking fear among loyalists for the future, the sizeable independence vote nonetheless may give pause to their tendency to triumphalism, challenging opinion polls and their own belief that they would win at least 60% and possibly 70% of the vote.

In their confidence, just days before the vote, the loyalists declared that with a massive win, they would seek to reverse the Noumea Accord guarantee of a second and potentially third referendum, an inflammatory step for independence supporters.

For independence leaders, the result vindicates their careful strategy of negotiating under the Noumea Accord for potentially two more votes in 2020 and 2022 in the event of a “no” vote, automatic participation for all Indigenous Kanaks, and mobilising the young.

Young Kanaks voted in large numbers, peacefully, and apparently for independence. This was so even in mainly European Noumea, which returned a surprising 26.29% “yes” vote.

With natural population growth, their numbers will increase as 18-year-olds become eligible to vote in 2020 and 2022. In contrast, the number of voters from other long-standing communities will vary little during this time-frame.

Independence leaders can also work to improve the vote from Kanak island communities, whose turnout remained at traditional lower levels, and those who may have responded this time to one independence party’s call for a boycott.

What does it mean for France?

The relatively close result means both sides may be more likely to participate constructively in the ongoing dialogue process set up by France.

Macron has urged New Caledonians to overcome division and continue the 30-year process “in favour of peace”, emphasising dialogue. He referred to a future within France and the Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Édouard Philippe visited the territory on November 5 to continue dialogue and urge calm.

The task of France remains delicate: to manage, impartially, a process respecting the positions of both sides. It’s complicated by the fact the 43.6% favouring independence are largely Indigenous Kanaks. They are not leaving, they have regional support, and their interests must be considered in any long-term future.




Read more:
Rebel music: the protest songs of New Caledonia’s independence referendum


On the positive side, positions canvassed by independence and loyalist parties alike threw up areas of shared interest that can form the basis of future cooperation. Provincial elections in May 2019 will clarify their support, but risk being undermined by extremist parties on both sides.

What are the implications for the region?

The result guarantees continued regional and international interest in the next steps. Reports of the Pacific Islands Forum and UN observer teams will be considered by their organisations. New Caledonia continues to be represented by the pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) at the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).

Separatists in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), set for their own independence referendum next year, and West Papua, both the subject of MSG attention, will take heart.

Macron’s invocation of his Indo-Pacific vision engaging New Caledonia specifically to counter China gives a new edge to the interest in the referendum process by regional countries and partners.

Australia, meanwhile, will continue to retain a close interest in stability in our near neighbour, respecting the process while continuing cooperation with France.The Conversation

Denise Fisher, Visiting Fellow, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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As Emmanuel Macron heads to Australia, the relationship is more important than ever



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Malcolm Turnbull would do well to take his lead from Emmanuel Macron on climate change.
AAP/Michael Reynolds

Tony Walker, La Trobe University

When French President Emmanuel Macron visits Australia this week for talks with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and other ministers, it will be an occasion of more than usual significance.

Coming on the heels of Macron’s talks in Washington with US President Donald Trump, Macron’s meetings with Turnbull will be informed by his impressions of an idiosyncratic presidency.

High on the list for discussion will be trade, including Australia’s desire for quick progress on a free trade agreement with the European Union. Regional security interests and climate change will also have an airing.




Read more:
Macron-Trump summit has high stakes for France’s embattled leader


Beyond all of that, Turnbull and Macron will no doubt seek to build on the amity apparent in France last week during the opening of the John Monash Centre at Villers-Bretonneux, where French Prime Minister Edouard Philippe gave a poignant speech.

For many young Australians, this earth was their final safe place. For many of them, this earth was the final confidante of a thought or a word intended for a loved one from the other side of the world. Loved ones who would only learn the sad news several months later.

More can be made of these occasions than is warranted, but the centenary of the end of the first world war provides an opportunity for two liberal democracies to reaffirm their commitment to human freedoms and the rule of law.

Australia and France may find themselves on opposite sides of the world, but in an era disrupted by China’s rise and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international norms, these sorts of relationships become more important.

Perhaps surprisingly, Macron will be only the second French president to visit Australia in the history of relations that go back to the mid-19th century, when consular links were first established. (The only other one to visit was Francois Hollande in 2014 for the G20.)

The first and second world wars strengthened those bonds, but it is probably fair to say Australia and France have not been as close to each other as might have been given their extensive trading and investment partnership.

That may be about to change, given the need for Australia to nurture its security relationships beyond the American alliance at a time of considerable uncertainty in global affairs.

While the US relationship remains the cornerstone of Australian security, a broadening of defence ties with other like-minded Western democracies – and regional powers like Japan – becomes more pressing.

The UK’s Brexit is putting greater onus on Australia’s European ties, which will no longer be viewed through London’s prism. This may turn out to be a benefit to Australia of Britain’s Brexit debacle.

Underpinning the Australian-French security relationship is the Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership signed in March 2017. This statement encourages the two countries to strengthen engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

In some respects, the strategic partnership could be regarded as symbolic. But it is having the effect of promoting enhanced contacts more or less across the board, including security, intelligence and climate issues.

The two sides have also been working on a logistical defence agreement to enable closer coordination in the Pacific, including combined force training exercises.

To an extent, this enhanced security relationship has been taking place under the radar. A growing security partnership was highlighted in Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper.

Both countries are active in arms control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security initiative.

Cyber security is another collaborative area.

None of this is to say that France has the capacity – or the intent – to be become an Indo-Pacific power. But it should be remembered that it retains Pacific possessions, namely New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna.

Indeed, it’s unlikely that Macron would have made the long journey to Australia if he was not also bound for New Caledonia, where its citizens will vote on independence from France in November this year. Macron will be seeking to forestall such an outcome.

Turnbull and Macron will no doubt dwell on Australia’s $50 billion deal to buy 12 French submarines, and progress made in establishing the Future Submarine Program based in Adelaide.

Whatever criticisms might have been levelled at the choice of the French option ahead of German and Japanese contenders, the FSP will bolster a significant long-term strategic partnership.

Among Turnbull’s preoccupations in his discussions with Macron will be to ensure negotiations on an Australian-EU free trade agreement get off to a good start.

Britain’s decision to leave the EU means such an agreement has come more sharply into focus. France’s powerful farming lobby dictates that it will be a cautious participant in discussions about an FTA that would improve access for Australian primary producers.

Gaining Macron’s personal support for such a process will be important.

In this regard, Turnbull would be able to point out that commercial and investment ties between the two countries are already extensive, leaving aside the fact the EU is the largest source of foreign investment and second-largest trading partner for Australia.

In 2015-16, the EU’s direct investment in Australia totalled $157.6 billion, and Australia’s investment in the EU was valued at $111.8 billion. Total two-way merchandise and services trade was worth $95.6 billion.

Of this, France’s direct investment in Australia was valued at $28 billion, and Australian investment in France at $55 billion. Most of France’s largest listed companies operate in Australia, employing something like 60,000 people. Two-way trade was worth about $8 billion in 2016, weighted significantly in France’s favour.

France itself is the world’s sixth-largest economy, fifth-largest exporter and a financial hub in the Eurozone. Its status as a financial centre will be enhanced post-Brexit.




Read more:
Macron’s mercenaries: police violence and neoliberal ‘reform’ in France


Then there is Macron, who has quickly established himself as a unique leader in a European context. His centrism as head of his own movement has not pleased all in the country he leads.

Macron’s relationship with Trump, built partly on their respective statuses as “ousiders”, gives the French president additional heft in an uncertain world.

His willingness to assert positions on climate change and the nuclear agreement with Iran that contradict those of the Trump administration further enhances his credibility. Turnbull would be advised to pay attention to what Macron has to say on a range of issues, not least climate.

As custodian of the Paris Accords, Macron has both a personal and professional interest in seeing the agreement strengthened, not diminished. His advice to the US Congress – “There is no Planet B” – resonated around the world.

The ConversationTurnbull could do worse than endorse Macron’s choice of words.

Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Yes, Syria’s Assad regime is brutal. But the retaliatory air strikes are illegal and partisan



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Civil war has raged in Syria for seven years.
AAP/ Youssef Badawi

Amy Maguire, University of Newcastle and Jason von Meding, University of Newcastle

The mainstream media have broadly accepted the justifications from the United States, France and Britain of humanitarian motivation for the retaliatory strikes against Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime.

Journalist Adam Johnson analysed US mainstream coverage and reported that:

major publications take the bulk of the premises for war for granted — namely the US’s legal and moral right to wage it — and simply parse over the details.

The air strike proceeded without publication of proof that Syria was responsible for the alleged atrocity in Douma. Reports are emerging that cast doubt on the official narrative.

Regardless, swift action was demanded and taken. Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are only now gaining access “to establish facts around the allegations of chemical weapons use in Douma”.

Strikes illegal under international law

Alongside claims for justification from the Trump administration, similar rhetoric featured in statements from French and British leaders. French President Emmanuel Macron claimed there was no doubt Syria was responsible for a chemical attack on civilians, in gross violation of international law. He said:

We cannot tolerate the trivialisation of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger for the Syrian people and our collective security.

British Prime Minister Theresa May agreed, saying “we cannot allow the erosion of the international norm that prevents the use of these weapons”. May identified the lack of consensus in the UN Security Council as a driving factor in the joint military action.

Even this week the Russians vetoed a resolution at the UN Security Council which would have established an independent investigation into the Douma attack. So there is no practicable alternative to the use of force to degrade and deter the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.

The United Nations Charter contains a prohibition on the threat or use of force against another state. Exceptions to this rule of international law are tightly constrained:

  • Under Article 51 of the Charter, states retain a right to individual and collective self-defence in the case of an armed attack.

  • Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council may authorise military force to restore international peace and security, if non-forceful measures have failed.

The British government has published a brief asserting the legality of the air strike on Syria as an exercise of “humanitarian intervention” (effectively invoking the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P, without explicitly mentioning it).

The argument is that the UK and its allies were entitled to use force against Syria because:

  • there was convincing evidence of large-scale and extreme humanitarian distress;
  • there was no practicable alternative to using force in order to save lives; and
  • the use of force in response was proportionate and time-limited to relieve humanitarian suffering.

Yet the R2P doctrine does not establish a new legal basis for the use of force. It allows for the use of force as “humanitarian intervention” only within the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, in the case of grave international crimes.

The Labour opposition in the UK has released its own legal opinion, sharply contradicting the government and asserting that the strikes were illegal.

Illegal but legitimate?

The allies responsible for this week’s air strike have not claimed explicit authorisation under the Charter. Instead, their aim has been to establish the legitimacy of the strike. This approach was endorsed by the European Union and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.

According to President Trump:

The nations of Britain, France, and the United States of America have marshalled their righteous power against barbarism and brutality.

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The Assad regime cannot be absolved of its brutality. Indeed, it is a fundamental objective of the post-second world war international legal order to save humanity from the “scourge of war” and promote human rights.

And there can be little doubt that the international legal system is far from perfect, having failed to protect populations around the world from gross violations of humanitarian and human rights law.

In Syria, hundreds of thousands have been killed over seven years of civil war, and millions are now refugees or internally displaced. The complexity of the conflict has seen monitors cease to estimate a death toll.

However, efforts to establish an alternative foundation for military action, beyond what is currently legal, pose risks that must be grappled with.

If states are permitted to determine when force is warranted, outside the existing legal framework, the legitimacy of that framework may be fatally undermined. How could any consistency of response be ensured? By what standard will states distinguish between benevolent and “rogue” regimes?

Leader of the UK opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, challenged Prime Minister May on these grounds:

Does the humanitarian crisis in Yemen entitle other countries to arrogate to themselves the right to bomb Saudi positions in Yemen, given their use of cluster bombs and white phosphorous?

Jeremy Corbyn | Response to Prime Minister’s Syria Statement.

It is relevant in this context that Saudi Arabia is a highly valued client of the British arms industry. According to War Child UK, total sales to the kingdom have topped £6 billion since the conflict in Yemen began. The UK has refused to support a proposed UN inquiry into allegations of Saudi war crimes in Yemen.

Meanwhile, crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations are alleged against Myanmar, the Philippines and Israel, among other states, without attracting the kind of “humanitarian intervention” undertaken in Syria.

Humanitarian intervention or regime change

Jeremy Corbyn has made the case for diplomacy as the only reasonable way forward. Syria should not be a war theatre in which the agendas of external actors take precedence, he argues.

The US has long envisaged regime change in Syria, and stepped up sponsorship of opposition groups since 2009.




Read more:
How the aid community responds in Syria will dictate its role in future crises


Robert Kennedy Jr. traced the history of US intervention in Syria from the first CIA involvement in 1949. He argues that this is another oil war, and says of broader interventionism in the Middle East:

The only winners have been the military contractors and oil companies that have pocketed historic profits, the intelligence agencies that have grown exponentially in power and influence to the detriment of our freedoms and the jihadists who invariably used our interventions as their most effective recruiting tool.

Central to US strategic thinking is the relationship between Syria and Iran. US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, seemed to say that a condition for US withdrawal is that Iran cease to function as an ally of Syria.

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The ConversationWith the US gaze so firmly fixed on Iran and Russia, the rationale for “humanitarian intervention” can and should be more firmly critiqued.

Amy Maguire, Senior Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights, University of Newcastle and Jason von Meding, Senior Lecturer in Disaster Risk Reduction, University of Newcastle

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Further strikes on Syria unlikely – but Trump is always the wild card



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Air strikes by the US, France and Britain destroy the Scientific Research Center building in Damascus, Syria.
AAP/ Youssef Badawi

Mehmet Ozalp, Charles Sturt University

A head-spinning series of events in the past few weeks have taken us from the United States pulling out of Syria, to analysts predicting the beginning of a third world war.

What has really happened in Syria, what are the ramifications of the joint strike from the US, France and Britain, and what can we expect from the key players?

Certainly, the mess in Syria and heightened tensions in the Middle East make us all fear an impending world war, especially when both the Russian and US presidents engage in a round of chest-thumping. Despite this, there is no certainty that a world war will be triggered from the Syrian conflict.

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The latest chemical attack, allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian government, followed by the US, British, French retaliation, is really about aligning an unpredictable Trump with the Syria policy of the state and military establishment in Washington.

Why the strikes?

A world power like the US is seldom reactive. It often uses events as key moments to implement new policies or shift policies. An apparent correlation of events with policy implementation justifies the policy in the eyes of internal constituents and the wider international community.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Russia has followed an open and consistent policy: declare Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime the legitimate government of Syria, always support his regime to ensure it doesn’t collapse, and morally justify its involvement as a struggle against terrorism. The unspoken policy is to build up a challenge to Western dominance over not only the Middle East, but geopolitical world order.

Yet, the US, and by extension Western policy on Syria, was tentative, unclear and seemed to change course over the seven-year conflict.

Under Barack Obama’s administration, the US consistently stayed out of direct involvement in the Syrian conflict. Busy with the Iraq exit, Obama missed the window of diplomatic opportunity in the crucial early months of the Syrian uprising in 2011. When violence started, Obama elected to provide limited military support to opposition groups, hoping they could muster enough power to dismantle Assad.

The Obama administration shifted its policy after a chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta in 2013 prompted it to push for a United Nations resolution demanding the destruction of chemical stockpiles. This in turn gave impetus to peace talks in Geneva. Apparently, the stockpiles were not destroyed, as we have seen more chemical attacks.




Read more:
Explainer: the war in Syria and the possibility of removing Assad


Obama admitted his strategy failed, as the “US was muscled out of Syria” by an increasingly bold Russian President Vladimir Putin. His support allowed Assad to gain the upper hand in Syria with the fall of Aleppo in December 2016. Efforts to make progress in the Geneva talks were continually stalled. The parties failed to make any meaningful progress even as late as 2017.

In the early months of his presidency, the expectation was that Trump would change the US policy on Syria. It was uncertain what trajectory it would take, and when it would come to pass.

Not much happened until yet another chemical-gas attack by Assad in April 2017. The US responded with a massive missile attack, taking out 20% of Assad’s air force. The result was that the Trump administration committed to a more active involvement in Syria and the complete dismantling of the Islamic State presence in the country, but not necessarily the removal of Assad.

It is now apparent there was a fundamental difference between Trump and the key people in his administration in their understanding of the US’ Syria policy.

For Trump, it was always about eliminating IS. On April 3, he announced that the US’ primary mission in Syria was “getting rid of ISIS”. Since this had now been completed, he could bring the troops home.

Yet, in December 2017, Defence Secretary James Mattis said the US would continue its presence in Syria as a “stabilising force” beyond IS.

In January 2018, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson confirmed the US would stay in Syria beyond IS, adding that the continued US presence aimed to prevent Iranian and Assad forces regaining territory “liberated with help from the United States”.

So, Trump’s withdrawal intentions, or rather the public announcement, came as a surprise to his own administration as well as the international community. In response, the US special envoy for the global coalition against IS, Brett McGurk, said:

We are in Syria to fight ISIS. That is our mission, and our mission isn’t over, and we are going to complete that mission.

Other officials from the US administration and military made conflicting statements.

Trump’s withdrawal announcement opened the ground for other players to assert their plans. On April 4, Russia, Iran and Turkey held a summit in Turkey, at which Putin announced:

We have agreed to expand the entire range of our trilateral cooperation in Syria.

The trio’s plan included an intensified Turkish operation in northern Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed “to clear all terror groups from Syrian border, including the YPG,” the Kurdish military force that was backed by the US in its bid to eradicate IS from Syria.

It seemed Syria would be left to Russia, Iran, Turkey and Assad. Until, of course, the most recent chemical attack in Douma, a suburb near Damascus, on April 7. The attack was blamed on the Assad government even though it vehemently denied it, and there were allegations of rebel involvement.

Importantly, the chemical attack conveniently served the faction in the US administration advocating for a greater involvement in Syria. Their arguments pushed Trump towards retaliation. In a matter of days, Trump went from vowing withdrawal from Syria to saying they have a “big price to pay”.

A military response in the form of a missile attack was inevitable, and so it took place on April 13, when the US and its allies, Britain and France, made “precision missile strikes against the Syrian government”. The six-day delay was really to gain international support for the attack so that it did not appear to be a showdown between Russia and the US.

Where to from here?

The most recent events in Syria were really about aligning Trump’s understanding of Syrian policy with that of the state and military establishment. The policy is to stay in Syria beyond IS, preventing its revival and preventing Iranian and Assad forces from regaining territory.

It is unlikely there will be any other military strikes by the US and its allies anytime soon. There are two possible wild cards though – Trump’s unpredictability and a possible Russian retaliation.

Elements within the US administration in favour of continued US involvement in Syria will have to keep Trump calm – give him reasons why he should continue committing to Syria, while preventing a direct Russian-US confrontation. Building a coalition with France and Britain prior to the missile retaliation served this purpose. It gave Russia the impression that the matter was a concern with the international community, rather than just the US.

Trump’s exaggerating nature and bombastic language in his tweets run the risk of escalating the situation. But they also help contain Russia, which is always unsure what Trump may say and do next.




Read more:
Stakes are high as Turkey, Russia and the US tussle over the future of Syria


A Russian response beyond condemnation is unlikely. Putin recently won a landslide victory in the March presidential elections. He is in no hurry to thump his chest into an all-out brawl with the US due to internal politics.

Furthermore, Russia is already in a diplomatic crisis over the assassination attempt of a former spy and his daughter with a nerve agent in London.

The US, Britain and more than a dozen European countries expelled Russian diplomats in retaliation. Putin is already quite vulnerable in the international scene. He will not enter a fight he is not certain to win.

The ConversationWhile the US and its allies may feel morally justified in attacking the Assad government targets, any such intervention is unlikely to help the people of Syria. They will continue to be collateral damage caught in the crossfire of geo-politics.

Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Conservatives suffer shock loss of majority at UK general election


Adrian Beaumont, University of Melbourne

At the UK general election held Thursday, the Conservatives lost their majority. With all 650 seats declared, the Conservatives won 318 seats (down 13 since the 2015 election), Labour 262 (up 30), the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 35 (down 21), the Liberal Democrats 12 (up 4). Northern Ireland (NI) parties hold 18 seats and five went to the Welsh nationalists and Greens.

Vote shares were 42.4% for the Conservatives (up 5.5), 40.0% for Labour (up 9.5), 7.4% for the Lib Dems (down 0.5) and 3.0% for the SNP (down 1.7). This was Labour’s highest vote since 2001, and the Conservatives’ highest vote since 1983. The total major party vote share was the highest since 1970. Election turnout was 68.7% (up 2.3 from 2015, and the highest turnout since 1997).

In NI, the very socially conservative Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won 10 of the 18 seats on 0.9% of the UK-wide vote. As Sinn Fein, which won 7 seats in NI, will not take its seats owing to historical opposition to the UK government’s rule of NI, the DUP and Conservatives have enough seats for a majority. PM Theresa May has come to an arrangement with the DUP, and the Conservatives will continue to govern.

The tweet and pictures of the right wing Daily Mail below show how shocking this result was. When Theresa May called the election, the Conservatives had a 15-19 point poll lead over Labour.

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While the Conservatives lost many seats to Labour and the Liberal Democrats in England and Wales, they gained 12 seats in Scotland. The overall Scotland results were SNP 35 of 59 seats (down 21), Conservatives 13 (up 12), Labour 7 (up 6) and Lib Dems 4 (up 3).

If the Conservatives had not performed so well in Scotland, it is likely that a progressive alliance of Labour, SNP and Lib Dems would have taken power. The Conservatives’ 13 Scottish seats are their most in Scotland since 1983.

There were several reasons for the Conservatives’ shocking performance. First, Labour’s manifesto had many popular measures, while the Conservative manifesto had a highly controversial proposal.

Second, US President Donald Trump is very unpopular in much of the developed world. Even if Trump had kept out of the way, there would probably have still been a “Trump Factor” in Labour’s rise. But Trump exacerbated this hatred by withdrawing from the Paris agreement a week before the election, and then by attacking the Muslim mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, after the London terror attack. The lesson for mainstream conservative parties is: keep your distance from Trump.

Third, I believe the Conservatives focused too much on Brexit in their campaign. The Brexit question was decided last year, and it probably did not have a great impact on voting. In my opinion, the Conservative campaign should have focused on the economy.

Conservatives win elections when in government by claiming that the opposition will wreck the economy through its reckless spending and increased taxation. The Conservatives should have focused on this message, and not on Brexit.

After beginning the campaign as a massive underdog, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s reputation has been greatly enhanced. Virtually all commentators assumed that radical left wing politics could never work, but he has proved them wrong. If not for the Scottish Conservative gains, Corbyn would probably be PM.

The best pollsters at this election were Survation, with a one-point Conservative lead, and SurveyMonkey, with a four-point lead (actual result 2.4 points). Other pollsters “herded” their final polls towards a 7-8 point lead. The worst results were from ComRes (a 10-point lead), ICM (12 points) and BMG (13 points). These three pollsters made large adjustments to their raw votes, and ended up overcompensating for the 2015 polling errors.

French lower house elections: 11 and 18 June

The French lower house has 577 members, elected by single-member electorates using a two-round system. The top two candidates in each seat, and any other candidate who wins over 12.5% of registered voters, qualify for the second round. Candidates sometimes withdraw before the second round to give their broad faction a better chance, and/or to stop an extremist party like Marine Le Pen’s National Front.

The key question is whether President Emmanuel Macron’s REM party will win a majority. Polling has the REM on about 30%, the conservative Les Républicains on 21%, the National Front on 18%, the hard left Unsubmissive France on 13% and the Socialists and Greens on a combined 11%.

The ConversationThere has been little movement in the polls since I last discussed the French lower house elections ten days ago. If the current polls are accurate, the REM will easily win a majority of the French lower house after the second round vote on 18 June. Polls for both the first and second round close at 4am Monday Melbourne time.

Adrian Beaumont, Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Newspoll steady at 53-47 to Labor. Plus UK and French elections


Adrian Beaumont, University of Melbourne

This week’s Newspoll, conducted Thursday to Sunday from a sample of 1655, is completely unchanged on voting intentions since last fortnight’s post-budget Newspoll. Labor leads 53-47, from primary votes of 36% Coalition, 36% Labor, 10% Greens and 9% One Nation.

35% were satisfied with Turnbull’s performance (up 2) and 54% were dissatisfied (up 1), for a net approval of -19. Turnbull’s ratings have risen from a net -29 in early April. According to Kevin Bonham, this is Turnbull’s best net approval since last September, breaking a run of 12 Newspolls with his net approval at or below -20. Shorten’s net approval was -20, up two points.

In my opinion, Turnbull’s gains on approval are because he is moving towards the centre on some policies, such as school funding and the bank levy. However, the electorate trusts Labor more on schools and health. Producing a “Labor-lite” budget has not helped the Coalition, as it surrenders on principles of fiscal rectitude, which are seen as strengths for the Coalition.

56% supported Labor’s position of only raising the Medicare levy for those earning at least $87,000 per year, while 33% supported the Coalition’s position of raising the Medicare levy for taxpayers who already pay the levy. 19% were very worried about a cost blowout for the National Disability Insurance Scheme, 46% were somewhat worried, and 24% not worried.

This Newspoll asked about leader traits, with May 2016 used for comparison. Both leaders fell on every trait, except the negative trait of “arrogant”. Turnbull led by seven points on “decisive and strong” and six points on “likeable”. Shorten led by nine points on “cares for people”, and trailed by 14 on the negative trait of “arrogant”.

Essential at 53-47 to Labor

Since last fortnight, the Coalition has gained a point in Essential. Primary votes are 38% Coalition (up 1), 36% Labor (down 2), 11% Greens (up 1), 5% One Nation (down 1) and 3% Nick Xenophon Team (steady). One Nation has dropped in Essential in the last two months, while holding up in Newspoll. Voting intentions were based on a two-week sample of 1780, with additional questions using just this week’s sample.

By 67-12, voters agreed that asylum seekers should be deported to their country of origin if their claims are unsuccessful. By 53-25, voters thought the government was not too tough on asylum seekers. By 40-32, they thought that asylum seekers who cannot be safely relocated to another country when Manus Island closes should not be brought to Australia.

Most major government decisions were well supported, with the exceptions of privatising Qantas, the Commonwealth Bank and Telstra.

48% thought the bank levy should apply to foreign banks and the big Australian banks, 16% thought it should also apply to small banks, 12% to the big Australian banks only and just 10% thought it should not apply to any bank.

38% thought Catholic schools would not be worse off under the new funding model, and 20% thought they would be worse off. By 52-23, voters would prefer an income tax cut to stronger workplace laws.

French lower house elections: 11 and 18 June

The French lower house is elected for a five-year term (the same as the President) using 577 single-member electorates. Unless one candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round on 11 June, the top two candidates in each seat proceed to the 18 June second round.

Candidates other than the top two can also advance to the second round if they win at least 12.5% of registered voters. That means those who did not vote or spoiled their ballots are counted in the determination. For example, if 50% abstain or spoil their ballots, a 25% threshold of valid votes must be met for candidates other than the top two to proceed to the second round.

The second round uses First Past the Post. As a result, third and sometimes second candidates will often withdraw prior to the second round, to give their broad faction a greater chance of winning, and/or to stop an extremist party like Marine Le Pen’s National Front.

The key question about the lower house elections is whether President Emmanuel Macron’s new party, La République en Marche! (Forward the Republic!) can win a majority. Polling has the REM on about 31%, followed by the conservative Les Républicains on 20%, the far right National Front on 19%, the hard left Unsubmissive France on 14%, and the Greens and Socialists have 10% combined.

If the election results are similar to these polls, the REM will be first or second in the vast majority of seats on 11 June. Whether their main opponent comes from the hard left, centre right or far right, the REM is likely to do well from the votes of excluded candidates, and easily win a majority of the French lower house on 18 June.

UK general election: 8 June

With nine days left until the UK election, polls have diverged. The most Labour-friendly polls (Survation, ORG, YouGov and SurveyMonkey) give the Conservatives 6-8 point leads over Labour. However, the ComRes and ICM polls have the Conservatives 12-14 points ahead. The 10-point Conservative lead in Opinium may be a result of Opinium polling in the two days immediately following the Manchester attack.

Turnout assumptions are the largest cause of the poll divergence. According to UK election analyst Matt Singh, the better polls for Labour use self-reported likelihood to vote among respondents, while ComRes and ICM use historical election turnout patterns to model this election’s turnout. Older people have historically been far more likely to vote than young people.

Turnout assumptions are making a large difference at this election as there is a massive divide between the generations. According to the latest YouGov poll, those aged 18-24 favour Labour by 69-12, while those aged over 65 favour the Conservatives by 66-16.

For Labour to pull off what would be one of the biggest upsets in election history, they need a massive turnout from young people. A five point Conservative lead would probably lead to a hung Parliament, so the more Labour-friendly polls are close to that.

Update Wednesday morning: A new ICM poll has the Conservatives leading by 12 points. However, as noted by UK Polling Report, the lead is only three points before adjustments for historical turnout likelihood among the various demographics.

Some on US right applaud Republican candidate’s assault of journalist

On Friday I wrote that, the day before a by-election, Republican candidate Greg Gianforte assaulted The Guardian’s reporter Ben Jacobs. Gianforte nevertheless won the by-election 50-44, and has been applauded by some on the US right; this attitude is shown by the Tweet and cartoon below.

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The ConversationThe donkey represents the Democrats in the US; an elephant represents Republicans.

Adrian Beaumont, Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Macron crushes Le Pen 66-34 in French Presidential runoff


Adrian Beaumont, University of Melbourne

With all results except overseas French in, centrist Emmanuel Macron has thrashed the far right Marine Le Pen by a 66.1-33.9 margin in yesterday’s French Presidential runoff election. Le Pen won only two of France’s 107 departments, and was buried by about 85-15 in Paris and its surrounds. In the first round, Macron had won 24.0% and Le Pen 21.3%. Supporters of other candidates gave Macron his huge runoff win. The Conversation

The French polls had Le Pen too high. Final polls had Macron leading Le Pen by about 62-38, a 24-point margin, compared with the actual 32-point margin. Since Trump won the US Presidency, far right candidates and parties in Austria, the Netherlands and now France have underperformed final pre-election polls; they have also tended to drop in the polls in the last week or so before the election.

As US poll analyst Harry Enten tweeted, the French poll miss was greater than any US poll miss at the 2016 election. It is possible that European poll overestimation of the far right is due to a vocal minority who support Trump, while the “silent” majority detest Trump and are pro-European Union.

Turnout for the runoff was 74.6%, but 11.5% of those voters deliberately spoilt their ballot, so effective turnout was 66.1%, down from 75.8% in the first round. This drop probably reflects the hard left’s aversion to choosing between a centrist and a far right candidate.

Elections for the French lower house will be held on 11 and 18 June. The lower house has 577 members, elected using single member electorates in a two-round system. These elections are deliberately timed to occur in a new President’s honeymoon period, in an attempt to avoid divided government. Both the lower house and the President are elected for five year terms.

The key question about the lower house elections is whether Macron’s new party, En Marche! (Onward!), can win a lower house majority, making the Presidency easier for Macron.

I wrote about the Obamacare repeal vote and the UK local government elections on Saturday. Yesterday, four polls were released for the 8 June UK general election showing the Conservatives leading Labour by 15-19 points.

Tasmanian upper house elections and polling

The Tasmanian upper house has 15 members elected for six year terms by single-member electorates. Every May, two or three of these electorates hold elections. On Saturday, Murchison, Launceston and Rumney voted.

In Murchison, left wing incumbent Independent Ruth Forrest defeated conservative Independent Daryl Quilliam 56.6-43.4. In Launceston, centrist incumbent Independent Rosemary Armitage defeated the somewhat more left wing Independent Neroli Ellis 52.1-47.9. In Rumney, Labor’s Sarah Lovell defeated conservative incumbent Independent Tony Mulder 52.3-47.7.

Labor’s gain in Rumney gives them three upper house seats; prior to May 2016, Labor held only one seat. There are four left wing Independents, so the left now holds 7 of the 15 seats. Kevin Bonham says the left now effectively has a blocking majority on legislation.

A Tasmanian EMRS poll, conducted 29 April to 2 May with a sample of 1000, has the Liberals on 39% (up 4 since March), Labor on 34% (up 5), the Greens on 15% (down 4), Independents 7% (down 3) and One Nation 3% (down 3). Kevin Bonham’s interpretation, given known EMRS biases to the Greens and Independents and against Labor, is Liberals 41%, Labor 37%, Greens 12% and One Nation 3%.

A 12 Liberals, 10 Labor, 2 Greens split is likely based on this poll, with the final Lyons seat to determine whether the Liberals can just retain a majority. Tasmania’s lower house has 25 members, elected using the Hare Clark system with five 5-member electorates. A Tasmanian election is due by early next year, and will probably be held in March 2018.

The better Premier measure is a spectacular result for new Labor leader Rebecca White; she trails incumbent Will Hodgman by just 42-39, compared with Hodgman’s massive 52-20 lead in March over former Labor leader Bryan Green. However, voting intentions suggest Labor is gaining from the Greens, but not from the Liberals.

Essential at 53-47 to Labor

Labor led by 53-47 in last week’s Essential. Primary votes were 38% Coalition, 37% Labor, 9% Greens, 7% One Nation and 3% Nick Xenophon Team.

30% (up 7 since December 2016) thought the economy was good and 29% (down 7) thought it was poor. 41% thought the economy was headed in the wrong direction and 29% the right direction.

On most spending priorities, far more people thought the government should increase than reduce spending in tomorrow’s budget, but unemployed aid, military spending, foreign aid and business assistance were exceptions. People expected the budget to be good for the well-off and Australian business, but bad for everyone else.

Respondents were confident that Turnbull could deliver secure borders and tougher citizenship requirements, but not confident on other Turnbull promises, such as jobs and growth and a balanced budget. By 61-24, voters were not confident that Turnbull could deliver action on climate change.

66% thought voting should continue to be compulsory, with 27% wanting a change to voluntary voting. 58% said they would definitely vote if voting were voluntary, and another 22% said they would be likely to vote.

Adrian Beaumont, Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.